Tigray’s Path to Peace: Navigating the Political Deadlock

The current political crisis in Tigray has reached a critical juncture, threatening to derail the progress made under the Pretoria Agreement and destabilize the region further. I sincerely believe that Abiy Ahmed neither has the desire nor the will to restore the status quo ante nor to bring lasting peace to Tigray and the northern parts of the region. Tigray must prepare itself for an eventual confrontation to secure its political objectives. Nevertheless, this opinion attempts to give a peaceful process a genuine chance. While the Pretoria Agreement provides a framework for peace and reconciliation, it is not an agreement embraced with full faith by both parties, particularly by Abiy Ahmed. There is significant skepticism about his willingness to adhere to the agreement unless forced and monitored by intermediaries and the international community. The TPLF must aggressively work to raise global awareness of this reality. However, to move forward, let us give the benefit of the doubt that the agreement will be fully and faithfully implemented as agreed.

The Current Context

During the genocidal war, the Federal Government labeled the TPLF as a “terrorist” organization and revoked its party registration from the country’s electoral commission. Following the Pretoria Agreement, the government agreed to revoke this labeling, officially recognizing the TPLF as the entity responsible for implementing the agreement. However, covert and manipulative actions soon followed.

Hidden agreements between the Federal Government and ‘some individuals’ within Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) led to the introduction of a bogus new registration of TPLF to the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). In an event at one of the newly established public parks in Addis, Abiy Ahmed, in the presence of the Pretoria Agreement facilitators, delivered a recognition to Getachew Reda, General Tsadikan, and General Tadesse Worede. His speech overrode the agreement, as if new working relationships had been agreed upon. At the time, no one questioned the legal consequences of this act, but it has since become evident that Abiy systematically and effectively blackmailed the Pretoria Agreement to serve his advantage.

This move, aimed at undermining the TPLF, was rejected outright by the party. While there was initial confusion surrounding the process, the TPLF has since taken a bold and unequivocal stance, rejecting any calls for registration or re-registration and recognizing these efforts as violations of the Pretoria Agreement’s core principles. These actions reflect Abiy Ahmed’s desperate strategy to destabilize Tigray further, especially as his covert operations and hidden agreements fail to achieve their intended outcomes.

The 14th Congress of the TPLF further compounded the challenges. Despite the majority of party cadres voting to proceed with the congress, a few central committee (CC) members, including President Getachew Reda, boycotted the event. The TPLF’s subsequent decision to revoke these individuals’ membership has critically impacted the TIRA’s ability to fulfill its objectives, as key positions within the administration are now compromised. This is particularly concerning given that these five key individuals hold prominent positions within the TIRA.

The transitional administration, initially formed as a coalition of stakeholders—including the TPLF, Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), other Tigrayan political parties, civic societies, and the Global Society of Tigrayan Scholars (GSTS)—was designed to unify efforts for the region’s recovery. However, the emergence of a splinter group led by Getachew Reda and Tsadikan Gebretinsay has significantly undermined its effectiveness.

This splinter group’s close relations with Abiy Ahmed have exposed internal party secrets, disrupting the political functioning of the TPLF. They have compromised Tigray’s political bargaining power by acting as double agents and receiving financial rewards from Abiy Ahmed. Furthermore, significant sums of money were funneled to urban youth-focused activities, particularly in Mekelle, creating the appearance of two distinct factions within the TPLF. While this narrative gained traction on social media, it does not reflect the reality on the ground, where most Tigrayans remain outside the social media sphere.

These dynamics and Abiy Ahmed’s covert strategy of “localizing” politics to fragment Tigray have further deepened divisions. Despite holding a majority with 14 out of 27 cabinet seats, the TPLF’s role as the presiding authority has been significantly undermined. The fractures within the leadership and the removal of key figures have eroded its ability to effectively govern and implement the objectives of the transitional administration. While the TPLF has revoked the party membership of these TIRA cabinet members, they remain in their positions with the tacit support of the Federal Government, which remains unyielding to the demands of the TPLF for re-arrangement. Subsequent meetings with Abiy Ahmed have not yielded tangible results, as he is now signaling through the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), demanding the TPLF undertake its party convention or face consequences.

Moreover, under the guise of fostering peace, the PP’s relinquishment of direct representation in the TIRA has enabled it to covertly exploit divisions within the TPLF and weaken Tigray’s political influence. Abiy Ahmed strives hard to project himself as an honest partner in the eyes of the mediators and the international community at large, all while orchestrating these covert manipulations to serve his broader objectives. This strategy aligns with broader objectives to diminish Tigray’s autonomy, facilitate territorial aggression by Amhara and Eritrean forces, and undermine the region’s social and cultural cohesion.

A Pragmatic Proposal

To break the current deadlock, a pragmatic solution must balance the immediate need for functional governance with the short-term objectives of restoring the status quo ante—Tigray as it was prior to the genocidal war. A key component of this solution is reorganizing and expanding the TIRA cabinet:

1. Reintegrating the Splinters: Getachew Reda and the other four former TPLF CC members, now publicly aligned with the PP, can retain their membership in the TIRA cabinet as representatives of the PP. This move acknowledges their new political alignment while ensuring continuity within the transitional administration. General Tsadikan, representing GSTS, has faced scrutiny regarding his effectiveness, and it is likely that the Global Society of Tigrayan Scholars (GSTS) may consider replacing him. However, this matter remains internal to the GSTS and is beyond the immediate concerns of the TIRA restructuring.
2. Replacing Key Positions: The TPLF can replace these individuals with new representatives, maintaining its majority and leadership within the TIRA. This ensures the party’s grassroots support and legitimacy remain intact.
3. Expanding the Cabinet: Increasing the TIRA cabinet from 27 to 33 members allows for broader representation and strengthens the coalition’s capacity to govern. Under this arrangement, the TPLF’s share would increase to 17 seats, reinforcing its leadership role.
4. Focusing on Core Objectives: A restructured TIRA must prioritize implementing the Pretoria Agreement, addressing the removal of occupying forces within constitutional Tigray borders, facilitating the return of displaced persons and their safety, and preparing for democratic elections in Tigray. These objectives require a clear timeline and dedicated resources.

A Clear Path Forward

The new, rearranged TIRA should immediately start functioning with a clear and agreed timetable that does not exceed four months. The main objective during this period should be the restoration of Tigray’s occupied lands and the return of displaced people. Once this objective is met, the TIRA should, within one year, facilitate an election that would enable the constitution of an elected government.

While other objectives may be considered cautiously, they are secondary to the urgent need for territorial restoration and the return of displaced persons. By focusing on these primary objectives, the TIRA can ensure a stable and sustainable transition, paving the way for a democratic future in Tigray.