Tigray’s Path to Peace: Navigating the Political Deadlock

The current political crisis in Tigray has reached a critical juncture, threatening to derail the limited progress made under the Pretoria Agreement and destabilize the region further. I remain deeply skeptical that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has the desire or political will to restore the status quo ante or to bring lasting peace to Tigray and the northern Horn. Tigray must therefore prepare itself politically, institutionally, and diplomatically for a difficult struggle to secure its core objectives.

Nevertheless, this opinion attempts to give a peaceful process a genuine chance. The Pretoria Agreement still provides a framework for peace, restoration, and reconciliation, even if it has not been embraced with full faith by all parties. There is significant reason to doubt the federal government’s willingness to implement the agreement fully unless pressure, monitoring, and international engagement remain sustained. TPLF and Tigrayan institutions must work more actively to raise global awareness of this reality. But for the sake of peace, the agreement should still be tested seriously and implemented as signed.

The Current Context

During the genocidal war, the Federal Government labeled the TPLF as a “terrorist” organization and revoked its party registration from the country’s electoral commission. Following the Pretoria Agreement, the government agreed to remove this designation and recognized the TPLF as the entity responsible for implementing the agreement. Yet the legal and political handling of TPLF’s status after Pretoria soon became a source of confusion and contestation.

Subsequent understandings between the Federal Government and some individuals within the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) appeared to introduce a new registration process for TPLF through the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). At an event in one of the newly established public parks in Addis Ababa, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in the presence of Pretoria Agreement facilitators, publicly recognized Getachew Reda, General Tsadikan, and General Tadesse Worede. His speech created the impression that a new working relationship had been established, with legal and political implications that were not adequately questioned at the time.

This move, which many TPLF members viewed as an attempt to undermine the party’s institutional standing, was rejected outright by the party. While there was initial confusion surrounding the process, TPLF later took a clear stance, rejecting calls for registration or re-registration that it viewed as inconsistent with the Pretoria Agreement’s core principles. These actions reinforced the belief among many Tigrayans that the federal government was using legal ambiguity to deepen Tigray’s internal divisions.

The Interim Administration and the Deadlock

The TPLF’s 14th Congress further complicated the political environment. Despite the majority of party cadres voting to proceed with the congress, several central committee members, including President Getachew Reda, boycotted the event. TPLF’s subsequent decision to revoke these individuals’ membership had serious consequences for TIRA, because several of those individuals held prominent positions within the interim administration.

The transitional administration was initially formed as a coalition of stakeholders, including TPLF, the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), other Tigrayan political parties, civic associations, and the Global Society of Tigrayan Scholars (GSTS). It was designed to unify efforts for Tigray’s recovery. However, the emergence of a splinter group led by Getachew Reda and Tsadikan Gebretinsay has significantly undermined its effectiveness.

The splinter group’s close working relationship with the Federal Government has weakened Tigray’s political bargaining position and disrupted the political functioning of TPLF. Its public posture has also created the appearance of two competing TPLF centers, a narrative that gained traction on social media even though most Tigrayans remain outside the digital spaces where such narratives dominate.

These dynamics, combined with the federal government’s apparent strategy of localizing Tigray’s politics and fragmenting its leadership, have deepened the crisis. Although TPLF held a majority within the cabinet arrangement, its role as the presiding political force was significantly weakened. The fractures within the leadership, and the continued presence of individuals whose party mandate had been revoked, eroded TIRA’s ability to govern effectively and implement the objectives of the transitional administration.

Moreover, under the guise of fostering peace, Prosperity Party’s withdrawal from direct representation in TIRA appears to have enabled it to influence Tigray’s internal divisions indirectly. Abiy Ahmed continues to present himself as an honest partner to mediators and the international community while benefiting from a weakened and fragmented Tigrayan political structure. This dynamic serves broader objectives: diminishing Tigray’s autonomy, delaying territorial restoration, and weakening the region’s social and political cohesion.

Why the Crisis Matters

This crisis is not simply about personalities or positions. It is about whether Tigray can maintain functional authority during a fragile post-war phase. TIRA was not created as a permanent government. It was created to facilitate Pretoria implementation, restore constitutional order, enable the return of displaced people, and prepare the ground for legitimate elections.

If the interim administration becomes a site of unresolved factional contestation, it cannot perform those tasks. Functional governance requires clarity over representation, authority, timelines, and priorities. Peace cannot be built on ambiguity that allows external actors to manipulate internal divisions.

A Pragmatic Proposal

To break the current deadlock, a pragmatic solution must balance the immediate need for functional governance with the short-term objective of restoring the status quo ante: Tigray as it was before the genocidal war. A key component of this solution is reorganizing and expanding the TIRA cabinet.

• Recognizing political realignment: Getachew Reda and the other former TPLF central committee members whose membership was revoked can retain roles in TIRA, but not as representatives of TPLF. They should participate under a clearly defined political identity, whether as independent actors, representatives of another political current, or figures aligned with the federal framework. This preserves continuity while ending ambiguity.
• Replacing TPLF positions: TPLF should be allowed to replace individuals whose party mandate has been revoked with new representatives. This preserves the party’s institutional continuity and ensures that its grassroots support and organizational legitimacy are not represented by those no longer authorized to speak for it.
• Expanding the cabinet: Increasing the TIRA cabinet from 27 to 33 members could allow broader representation and strengthen the coalition’s capacity to govern. Under such an arrangement, TPLF’s representation should be sufficient to reflect its role as a central political actor while leaving room for other stakeholders.
• Focusing on core objectives: A restructured TIRA must prioritize Pretoria implementation, removal of occupying forces from Tigray’s constitutional territories, return and safety of displaced people, humanitarian recovery, and preparation for democratic elections in Tigray. These objectives require a clear timeline and dedicated resources.

A Clear Path Forward

The reorganized TIRA should begin functioning immediately with a clear and agreed timetable. The first phase should focus on the restoration of Tigray’s occupied lands, the return of displaced people, humanitarian stabilization, and the reestablishment of administrative coherence. Once these immediate objectives are meaningfully advanced, TIRA should prepare a credible process for elections that can produce a legitimate government.

Other objectives may be considered cautiously, but they must not distract from the urgent priorities: territorial restoration, IDP return, Pretoria implementation, and institutional clarity. By focusing on these primary objectives, TIRA can create the conditions for a stable transition and a democratic future in Tigray.

The purpose of this proposal is not factional victory. It is functional governance. Tigray cannot afford an interim administration trapped between competing mandates, external pressure, and internal ambiguity. Peace requires structure. Recovery requires authority. And Tigray’s people deserve institutions capable of defending their rights, restoring their homes, and preparing the ground for legitimate self-government.