From Interrupted Mandate to Reconstituted Authority: Why Tigray Can No Longer Remain Inside Managed Uncertainty

For those of you who don’t have time, or the guts, to read through the details, here is the summary of my opinion. And for those who disagree, I am waiting for a written argument, not a social media reaction.

What Must Be Done Now

1. Stop waiting. Act now.
This is no longer a safe pause. Every day without a clear authority weakens Tigray.
2. Bring back the 2020 parliament.
It was not defeated. It was interrupted by war. Its legitimacy still stands. Restore it.
3. Do not just restore old seats. Add new voices.
Vacant seats are not gaps, they are opportunities. Bring in political parties and civic actors who were excluded in 2020. Strengthen the base.
4. Do not make this about personalities. Make it about structure.
Do not turn this into a conflict around individuals. Frame it clearly: Tigray needs a functioning institution.
5. Handle the transition carefully but firmly.
The interim leadership should have a transitional role. Not a central role. Not a blocking role. Move forward without internal rupture.
6. Declare clearly: Tigray will not remain in managed uncertainty.
Tigray will not remain in managed uncertainty. Reconstitution is not symbolic—it is a declaration of political agency.

The single bottom line:

Restore the parliament. Expand its base. Do it now. Do it without internal war.

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There are moments in history where time allows recovery, and there are moments where time deepens exposure. Tigray today stands in the latter condition. What appears as patience, restraint, or strategic waiting has evolved into a prolonged state where uncertainty is not only present but actively structured. This is not a neutral environment. It is a political condition sustained to prevent Tigray from stabilizing, consolidating, and acting with clarity. In such a context, waiting is no longer a strategy. It is a form of vulnerability.

The Collapse of Process and the Burden of Reality

The Pretoria framework, whatever its initial promise, has effectively ceased to function as a living process. Its core provisions remain unimplemented, its spirit has been consistently undermined, and its operational relevance has been reduced to a symbolic reference point rather than a guiding framework. What remains on the ground is not a peace process, but a managed political vacuum. This vacuum is not accidental. It is sustained through calculated ambiguity, delayed decisions, and selective engagement. The result is a condition where Tigray is prevented from transitioning into a stable political and administrative order while simultaneously being exposed to renewed threats of aggression, continued occupation, and prolonged economic strangulation. Under such conditions, the question is no longer whether Tigray should wait. The question is how long it can afford to remain structurally suspended without a functioning and legitimate authority of its own.

The Interrupted Mandate and Its Continuing Legitimacy

The 2020 regional election in Tigray was not an abstract political exercise. It was a concrete expression of popular sovereignty under exceptionally difficult conditions. Millions participated. Institutions were mobilized. Political actors engaged. The outcome was clear, structured, and institutionally anchored. That mandate was not politically defeated. It was interrupted by war.

This distinction remains essential. A mandate that expires through political processes is fundamentally different from a mandate that is disrupted by force. In the latter case, legitimacy does not disappear; it is suspended, awaiting restoration under conditions that allow governance to resume.

It is often argued that, under the Pretoria agreement, the status of the 2020 election was set aside. This is formally correct, but politically incomplete. That acceptance was not an unconditional abandonment of the mandate. It was a strategic concession made within a broader framework, on the assumption that the agreement would lead to normalization: restoration of territories, return of displaced populations, reestablishment of constitutional order, and a credible path toward stable governance. None of these core expectations have been realized. What has instead emerged is a prolonged condition of instability, continued occupation, incomplete disarmament processes, and the absence of a functioning constitutional order. Under such conditions, the political basis upon which that concession was made no longer holds.

Agreements derive their meaning not only from what is signed, but from what is implemented. When the central provisions of an agreement are systematically undermined or left unfulfilled, its internal balance collapses. In this context, the question is no longer whether the 2020 mandate was once set aside. The question is whether the conditions that justified setting it aside still exist. They do not. Revisiting the 2020 mandate is therefore not a rejection of process, but a response to its collapse. It is an attempt to restore an internally grounded legitimacy in the absence of a functioning external framework. To ignore this distinction is to accept that a suspended process can indefinitely override a people’s expressed will. To recognize it is to understand that legitimacy, once established, cannot be permanently displaced by an agreement that no longer operates in practice.

Reconstitution as the Only Viable Path Forward

Tigray today does not face a theoretical governance challenge. It faces an immediate and practical need to restore a functioning authority capable of decision-making, coordination, and representation. In this context, the reconstitution of the last elected regional parliament emerges not as one option among many, but as the only viable and internally grounded path forward.

This is not about returning to the past. It is about restoring a legitimate institutional foundation that can operate under present realities. Without such a foundation, Tigray remains exposed to fragmentation, external manipulation, and internal paralysis. The alternative proposals that call for entirely new transitional arrangements fail to recognize the urgency and fragility of the current moment. Experimentation under conditions of siege, displacement, and external threat is not innovation; it is risk. Reconstitution, by contrast, offers continuity, clarity, and legitimacy.

Inclusion as Intentional Design, Not Political Adjustment

One of the central concerns raised by various political actors within Tigray relates to the concentration of power and the fear of exclusion. These concerns are not without basis, and they must be addressed directly and structurally.

The reconstitution of the 2020 parliament must therefore not be approached as a mechanical restoration of previous seat allocations. It must be approached as a deliberate and conscious political design that expands inclusion while preserving legitimacy.

Here, the lesson from the 2020 electoral logic becomes instructive, not as a rigid formula, but as a guiding principle. At that time, there was recognition that overwhelming electoral dominance could inadvertently narrow political space. The response was to introduce mechanisms that allowed emerging political actors to have representation and relevance. That same spirit must now guide the reconstitution process.

Vacant seats resulting from war, displacement, political realignment, or other disruptions should not be treated as mere absences to be administratively filled. They represent an opportunity to intentionally broaden the political base of the reconstituted authority.

This can be achieved through a structured methodology that:

• Prioritizes the inclusion of political parties that participated in the 2020 election but did not secure seats
• Creates space for civic actors and community representatives who have played a role during the war and its aftermath
• Maintains the core electoral mandate while expanding the representational base of the institution

Such an approach does not dilute legitimacy. It strengthens it. It signals that the reconstituted authority is not simply a continuation of a single political force, but a platform for collective political responsibility under extraordinary conditions.

Addressing the Question of Leadership and Trust

A significant layer of resistance to this process is not institutional, but political. It revolves around questions of leadership, trust, and past decisions. There are those who question whether a leadership that has acknowledged strategic miscalculations, including critical wartime decisions, can be entrusted with renewed authority. This concern must not be dismissed. It reflects a broader demand for accountability and evolution.

At the same time, the present moment requires a sober assessment of realities. First, the urgency of Tigray’s condition demands a functioning authority that can mobilize, coordinate, and respond. The existing political and military structures, despite their imperfections, remain the backbone of Tigray’s resistance and organizational capacity. Second, there has been internal adjustment within the dominant political structures, including efforts to reassess leadership, improve coordination, and incorporate new actors. These processes may be incomplete, but they indicate movement rather than stagnation. Third, in the external arena, the political recognition and engagement that Tigray has established remain tied to existing institutional actors. This reality cannot be ignored when considering legitimacy beyond internal dynamics. The question, therefore, is not whether the current leadership is flawless. It is whether Tigray can afford institutional vacuum while seeking perfection. The answer is clear.

Managed Uncertainty as Strategy and the Need to Break It

The condition in which Tigray finds itself is not merely the result of post-war complexity. It is shaped by a broader strategy that relies on prolonging ambiguity, delaying stabilization, and preventing the emergence of a consolidated political authority.

One year into the interim arrangement, even its own performance record now reflects its structural limitations. Critical mandates remain unfulfilled, the return of displaced populations has stalled, and the rule of law continues to erode under fragmented authority. The extension of the interim administration does not resolve these failures; it prolongs them. This is not a question of individual leadership performance. It is a reflection of a system that was never designed to restore full political functionality to Tigray.

Within this framework, extending interim arrangements, avoiding decisive transitions, and maintaining institutional fragility serve a clear purpose: to keep Tigray in a state where it cannot fully organize, assert itself, or negotiate from a position of clarity.

Breaking this pattern requires a decisive internal move. Reconstituting the regional parliament is not simply an administrative act. It is a political statement that Tigray refuses to remain inside a managed condition of uncertainty designed by external forces.

Toward Functional Authority and Collective Survival

The objective of reconstitution is not symbolic. It is functional. Tigray requires an authority that can coordinate internal governance and service delivery under constrained conditions; mobilize society in a structured and unified manner; engage external actors with clarity and legitimacy; and prepare for both defensive scenarios and long-term recovery. None of these functions can be effectively carried out in a condition of institutional suspension. Reconstitution provides the minimum structural coherence required to move from reactive survival to organized resilience.

Managing Transition Without Internal Rupture

The current moment introduces a new layer of complexity that must be handled with precision. The return of Lt. Gen. Tadesse and the extension of the interim administration’s mandate are not neutral developments. They introduce the risk of internal political friction at a time when Tigray can least afford it.

If mismanaged, this moment could be transformed into a confrontation between the interim leadership and those advocating for the reconstitution of the 2020 parliament. Such a confrontation would not resolve the underlying crisis. It would deepen it. More importantly, it would serve external interests that benefit from a divided and internally preoccupied Tigray. This must be avoided.

The question before Tigray is not whether one leadership replaces another. The question is whether Tigray can transition from a structurally limited interim arrangement to a legitimate and functional authority of its own.

In this context, the reconstitution of the regional parliament must be positioned clearly as a structural necessity, not a political attack. It is not directed against individuals. It is directed toward restoring an institutional foundation that allows Tigray to function, coordinate, and act with clarity.

At the same time, political maturity requires that this transition creates space rather than closes it. The process must be deliberately inclusive, allowing other political actors and civic forces within Tigray to see themselves reflected in the emerging structure. This is not a concession. It is a requirement for stability and collective ownership.

The role of the interim leadership, including Lt. Gen. Tadesse, should therefore be understood within this transition. A confrontational path would only produce fragmentation. A managed alignment, however, allows for continuity without paralysis and transition without rupture.

This is where discipline becomes critical. The objective is not to win an internal political contest. The objective is to prevent internal fragmentation while restoring functional authority. Only in this way can Tigray deny external actors the opportunity to exploit divisions and prolong the condition of managed uncertainty. The moment demands clarity, restraint, and strategic coherence.

Conclusion: From Suspension to Agency

Tigray stands at a critical juncture. The continuation of the current condition offers no pathway to stability, security, or recovery. It only prolongs exposure and deepens vulnerability.

The reconstitution of the 2020 elected parliament, carried out with deliberate inclusion and conscious design, provides a path out of this suspension.

It restores a foundation of legitimacy.
It expands political space.
It enables coordinated action.

Most importantly, it marks a transition from being managed by uncertainty to acting with agency. That transition is no longer optional. It is necessary.