{"id":6665,"date":"2026-05-23T15:31:03","date_gmt":"2026-05-23T15:31:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/?p=6665"},"modified":"2026-05-23T16:34:14","modified_gmt":"2026-05-23T16:34:14","slug":"tigrays-youth-are-not-fuel-but-tigray-must-not-be-demobilized","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/en\/2026\/05\/23\/tigrays-youth-are-not-fuel-but-tigray-must-not-be-demobilized\/","title":{"rendered":"Tigray’s Youth Are Not Fuel – But Tigray Must Not Be Demobilized"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Tigray\u2019s challenge is not only to prepare for danger, but to do so without breaking the moral bond between the youth, the people, and the national cause.<\/em><\/p>

Tigray is again being pushed into a dangerous moral and strategic debate. On one side, there is a legitimate fear that young people may be treated as expendable instruments of political or military decisions they do not understand, did not debate, and may not trust. On the other side, there is an equally dangerous effort to turn that fear into a broader message of demobilization: that Tigray has no cause left worth defending, that every call for preparedness is merely an attempt by the TPLF’s core leadership to preserve itself, and that resistance itself has become meaningless.<\/p>

Both tendencies must be confronted clearly.<\/p>

Tigray’s history of mobilization is widely documented. This is a people that has fought with conviction and cause \u2014 not by coercion as doctrine, not by treating human life as cheap. That record is not perfect, because no human institution is. But it is real, and it matters in this debate.<\/p>

Since May 5, when the reinstated State Council elected Debretsion Gebremichael as president and Tigray’s political leadership openly challenged the federal framework, the debate over preparedness has intensified. Recent public reactions show that the question of youth mobilization has moved beyond political circles and entered family life, community anxiety, and the wider moral debate about Tigray’s future. The reconstitution of political authority has not resolved the question of military posture. It has made it more urgent and more contested.<\/em><\/p>

This piece addresses that debate directly.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>

Tigray’s youth are not fuel. They are not raw material for power. They are not numbers to be moved by command, fear, humiliation, or confusion. No leadership, no party, no military structure, and no political organization has the moral right to treat the life of a young Tigrayan as cheap. If there are local abuses, mismanagements, or unclear practices in the name of mobilization, they must be corrected immediately. But isolated failures must not be falsely presented as the essence of Tigray’s national preparedness \u2014 or weaponized into a narrative that erases Tigray’s documented history of conviction-based struggle.<\/p>

But Tigray must not be demobilized either.<\/p>

A people that survived a genocidal war cannot be told, at this hour, that all organized preparedness is illegitimate. A society whose land remains occupied, whose displaced people remain in camps, whose economy is squeezed, whose institutions are under pressure, and whose enemies are still animated by vengeance cannot afford to dismantle its own capacity to defend itself. The question is not whether Tigray needs preparedness. It does. The question is what kind of preparedness can preserve both the dignity of the youth and the survival of the nation.<\/p>

The answer cannot be coercion. But it cannot be demobilization.<\/p>

The danger surrounding Tigray is real<\/strong><\/p>

Any honest discussion must begin from the danger Tigray faces.<\/p>

Tigray is not living in a normal political environment. Western Tigray remains occupied. Displaced families remain unable to return to their homes. Federal restrictions continue to affect fuel, transport, salaries, public administration, and ordinary economic life. The Pretoria framework has not produced the basic outcomes Tigrayans were told to expect. Eritrea remains a central factor in every northern security calculation. Addis Ababa continues to frame Tigray’s political moves as threats to Ethiopian sovereignty while presenting its own pressure as constitutional order.<\/p>

This is not an abstract danger. It is not only a danger produced by Tigray’s weakness. It is also a danger fueled by vengeance, resentment, and the political hatred that the Prosperity Party project has directed toward Tigray. The ruling order in Addis Ababa has repeatedly treated Tigray not as a political community with rights, history, and constitutional standing, but as an enemy to be weakened, contained, humiliated, and politically erased.<\/p>

That hostility matters.<\/p>

A society facing such hostility cannot survive by wishful thinking. It cannot survive by hoping that the enemy will become reasonable simply because Tigray chooses silence. It cannot survive by confusing exhaustion with peace. And it cannot survive by allowing others to define what counts as acceptable Tigrayan action.<\/p>

This is why national preparedness remains necessary.<\/p>

But because the danger is real, the method of preparedness must be even more disciplined. A just cause can be weakened by unjust methods. A necessary defense can lose legitimacy if it is conducted without clarity, consent, accountability, and political explanation. Tigray must not imitate the coercive practices of those who tried to destroy it.<\/p>

Why the last mobilization cannot simply be repeated<\/strong><\/p>

During the genocidal war, Tigray’s mobilization did not depend mainly on coercion. Its moral power came from existential clarity. People saw the danger. They understood what was happening. They knew that Tigray was facing destruction. They did not need abstract speeches to know what the war meant. The enemy had already explained it through siege, massacre, starvation, displacement, sexual violence, and territorial occupation.<\/p>

That is why sacrifice became meaningful.<\/p>

The youth did not rise because they were cattle. They rose because they understood that the survival of their people was at stake. Families gave sons and daughters not because life was cheap, but because the alternative was collective destruction. The moral relationship between society and fighter was built on recognition, not command alone.<\/p>

That relationship must not be broken.<\/p>

Today’s situation is different. The danger remains real, but the form of danger is more complex. It is slower, more political, more fragmented, more psychological, and more easily disguised. It appears through unresolved occupation, economic strangulation, diplomatic ambiguity, factional confusion, fuel restrictions, institutional pressure, and the steady normalization of Tigray’s suffering.<\/p>

Because the danger is less visibly concentrated than during the height of the war, the political explanation must be stronger, not weaker. The leadership cannot assume that the youth will automatically understand the objective. It must explain it. It must define the threat. It must clarify the purpose. It must identify the chain of responsibility. It must show the path from sacrifice to outcome.<\/p>

A young person asked to risk life has the right to know: for what, under whose command, by what legal authority, toward what objective, and with what accountability?<\/p>

These are not anti-struggle questions. They are the questions that distinguish national defense from blind militarization.<\/p>

Coercion is not discipline<\/strong><\/p>

One of the gravest mistakes a leadership can make is to confuse coercion with discipline.<\/p>

Discipline is political clarity translated into organized action. Coercion is the use of force to cover the absence of clarity. Discipline produces confidence. Coercion produces fear. Discipline strengthens the bond between people and institutions. Coercion breaks that bond. Discipline creates fighters who understand why they stand. Coercion creates resentment, escape, sabotage, and moral exhaustion.<\/p>

Tigray does not need fear-based mobilization. It needs conviction-based preparedness.<\/p>

The TPLF’s historical operational culture was built on exactly that principle. At its best, it politicized sacrifice, connected people to a cause they understood, and drew its strength from conviction rather than command. That is widely documented and widely acknowledged. It does not mean the institution has been without failure. In any system operating under siege, uncertainty, and the pressures of an incomplete peace, local mismanagements can occur. Those must be corrected as the failures they are \u2014 not inflated into a political narrative that equates Tigray’s preparedness with the coercive machinery of its enemies.<\/p>

Where youth are approached without political explanation, that falls short of the standard Tigray has historically set for itself. Where families are left in the dark about what is happening, that too falls short. Where service \u2014 in any form \u2014 becomes associated with confusion, fear, or arbitrary command rather than shared purpose and political clarity, that is a failure of discipline, not an expression of it. Tigray’s own history demands better.<\/p>

Tigray’s historic strength did not come from treating its people as disposable. It came from politicizing sacrifice, giving meaning to hardship, and creating a relationship between the cause and the people. Once that relationship is damaged, no amount of command can replace it.<\/p>

This is why any departure from that standard must be corrected immediately.<\/p>

Not because Tigray does not need defense. But because Tigray does need defense. A defense built on broken trust is not defense. It is decay in uniform.<\/p>

Demobilization is also dangerous<\/strong><\/p>

But the opposite danger must also be named.<\/p>

Some voices are no longer simply opposing coercion. They are moving toward a message that effectively tells the youth: do not fight, do not prepare, do not trust any organized call, do not believe there is a national cause, because everything is only about leadership seats and personal power.<\/p>

That message is not protection. It is demobilization.<\/p>

It is one thing to oppose coercion. That is correct and necessary. It is another thing to reduce Tigray’s survival problem to a factional effort by the TPLF’s core leadership to preserve itself, or to claim that no legitimate defense question remains. That is false and politically irresponsible.<\/p>

Tigray’s dangers are not imaginary. Western Tigray is not imaginary. The displacement of our people is not imaginary. Federal pressure is not imaginary. Eritrea’s role in the northern equation is not imaginary. The hatred embedded in the Prosperity Party’s political treatment of Tigray is not imaginary. The desire of our enemies to see Tigray weak, divided, exhausted, and permanently contained is not imaginary.<\/p>

So the correct message to the youth cannot be: there is nothing worth defending.<\/p>

The correct message must be: do not allow your life to be used without clarity, but do not allow your nation to be stripped of its capacity to survive.<\/p>

Exhaustion is not a strategy<\/strong><\/p>

Tigray is tired. That must be acknowledged.<\/p>

The people have buried too many. Families have paid too much. The youth have carried burdens that no generation should be asked to carry twice. Mothers and fathers cannot be expected to hear the language of mobilization without fear. A society that has endured genocide, siege, hunger, displacement, and betrayal will naturally ask hard questions when its children are again mentioned in the language of defense.<\/p>

Those questions are legitimate.<\/p>

But exhaustion cannot become strategy. Trauma cannot become policy. Fear cannot be allowed to define the entire horizon of national action. If Tigray’s enemies are still organized, if the occupation is still in place, if displacement is still unresolved, if the federal center still uses pressure and ambiguity, then Tigray’s exhaustion must be honored without being converted into surrender.<\/p>

This is the difficult balance.<\/p>

Leadership must not abuse the people’s sacrifice. But society must not be persuaded that sacrifice itself has lost meaning. What has lost legitimacy is unclear sacrifice, imposed sacrifice, careless sacrifice, and sacrifice demanded without accountability. What remains legitimate is sacrifice tied to a clear national purpose, lawful structure, political explanation, and a real path toward protecting the people.<\/p>

What responsible national preparedness must now consolidate<\/strong><\/p>

If Tigray needs preparedness, and it clearly does, then the task is not to pretend that nothing is being done. Much of the foundational work appears to be underway. The real question is whether this work is being communicated clearly, governed lawfully, socially legitimized, and tied to a strategy the people can understand and trust.<\/p>

Political explanation must therefore accompany the work already underway. The people must be told clearly what the threat is, what the objective is, and what forms of participation are required. Ambiguity breeds suspicion, and after everything Tigray has endured, suspicion is not weakness \u2014 it is memory.<\/p>

The same is true of legality and accountability. If structures are being reorganized, if communities are being asked to prepare, and if youth are being registered or mobilized in any form, the process must be governed by defined authority and visible rules. No family should be left wondering who is making decisions, why those decisions are being made, and under what responsibility.<\/p>

Preparedness must also continue to widen the meaning of service. Defense is not only carrying a gun. Tigray needs logistics, documentation, communications, medical support, civil administration, transport, intelligence, diplomacy, legal work, and humanitarian organization. A serious national system does not reduce every young person to a front-line body.<\/p>

The gap, therefore, is not necessarily absence of effort. The gap is trust. The work must be seen, explained, disciplined, and owned by society. Communities must understand the purpose. Families must be respected. Local structures must not become instruments of fear. Religious, civic, youth, and women’s voices must be part of the moral conversation about what national duty means at this hour.<\/p>

Above all, preparedness must be tied to political strategy. The youth must not be asked to carry the burden of a leadership whose direction appears unclear to the public. Defense must be connected to the return of displaced people, the restoration of territorial integrity, the protection of civilian life, the defense of Tigray’s political agency, and the prevention of another catastrophe. Preparedness without visible strategy can easily be misread as organized confusion, even when the intention behind it is serious.<\/p>

And those who call for sacrifice must be accountable for decisions, consequences, and truth. A people cannot be asked to trust blindly after everything it has endured.<\/p>

The youth must be respected as political subjects<\/strong><\/p>

The young generation of Tigray is not ignorant. It is not passive. It is not waiting to be ordered into meaning. It has lived through war, hunger, social collapse, exile, family grief, unemployment, and political betrayal. It has seen the failures of leaders and the cruelty of enemies. It has the right to ask questions.<\/p>

But asking questions should not be treated as betrayal. And defending Tigray should not be treated as foolishness.<\/p>

The youth must be addressed as political subjects, not as tools. They should be told the truth. They should be trusted with complexity. They should be allowed to understand the difference between coercion and duty, between blind obedience and conscious sacrifice, between personal power struggles and national survival.<\/p>

The youth saved Tigray once because they understood the cause. If Tigray expects them to carry responsibility again in any form, the cause must again be made clear, credible, and worthy.<\/p>

The enemy is watching our moral confusion<\/strong><\/p>

There is another reason this debate matters.<\/p>

Our enemies are watching.<\/p>

The Prosperity Party order has always benefited when Tigray is morally confused, internally divided, and unsure of its own legitimacy. It benefits when Tigray’s necessary defense is made to look like mere factional militarism. It benefits when coercive mistakes create public anger. It benefits when demobilizing voices turn that anger into rejection of all national preparedness. It benefits when the youth lose trust in institutions. It benefits when the elite amplifies despair without offering a serious path.<\/p>

This is how a people can be weakened without a major battle.<\/p>

The danger Tigray faces is not only military. It is psychological, political, and moral. The enemy does not only want Tigray disarmed physically. It wants Tigray demobilized mentally. It wants Tigrayans to doubt every institution, every call, every sacrifice, every possibility of organized action. It wants the people to conclude that nothing is worth defending because every defense is only another trick by leaders.<\/p>

That is why the response must be precise.<\/p>

We must reject coercion without rejecting preparedness. We must demand accountability without destroying national confidence. We must criticize leadership without repeating enemy narratives. We must protect the youth without teaching them helplessness.<\/p>

The line Tigray must hold<\/strong><\/p>

The line is simple but difficult.<\/p>

Tigray’s youth are not fuel. But Tigray must not be demobilized.<\/p>

No young person should be dragged into danger without clarity, legitimacy, and accountability. But no young Tigrayan should be told that the survival of Tigray is no longer their concern. No family should be forced to give its children to an unclear cause. But no society can survive if it teaches its children that organized defense is meaningless.<\/p>

This is not a call for war. It is a call for seriousness.<\/p>

Tigray needs peace, but peace must be real. Tigray needs dialogue, but dialogue must not become a cover for slow surrender. Tigray needs restraint, but restraint must not mean paralysis. Tigray needs preparedness, but preparedness must be lawful, transparent, accountable, and politically explained.<\/p>

The people of Tigray have paid too much to be manipulated by fear. They have also paid too much to be demobilized by despair.<\/p>

The task now is to rebuild a moral and political relationship between the youth, the people, and the national cause.<\/p>

That relationship cannot be built through coercion.<\/p>

It also cannot be built through surrender.<\/p>

It can only be built through truth, clarity, responsibility, and a national purpose worthy of the life of the young generation.<\/p>

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Tigray\u2019s challenge is not only to prepare for danger, but to do so without breaking the moral bond between the youth, the people, and the national cause. Tigray is again being pushed into a dangerous moral and strategic debate. On one side, there is a legitimate fear that young people may be treated as expendable instruments of political or military decisions they do not understand, did not debate, and may not trust. On the other side, there is an equally dangerous effort to turn that fear into a broader message of demobilization: that Tigray has no cause left worth defending, that every call for preparedness is merely an attempt by the TPLF’s core leadership to preserve itself, and that resistance itself has become meaningless. Both tendencies must be confronted clearly. Tigray’s history of mobilization is widely documented. This is a people that has fought with conviction and cause \u2014 not by coercion as doctrine, not by treating human life as cheap. That record is not perfect, because no human institution is. But it is real, and it matters in this debate. Since May 5, when the reinstated State Council elected Debretsion Gebremichael as president and Tigray’s political leadership openly challenged the federal framework, the debate over preparedness has intensified. Recent public reactions show that the question of youth mobilization has moved beyond political circles and entered family life, community anxiety, and the wider moral debate about Tigray’s future. The reconstitution of political authority has not resolved the question of military posture. It has made it more urgent and more contested. This piece addresses that debate directly. Tigray’s youth are not fuel. They are not raw material for power. They are not numbers to be moved by command, fear, humiliation, or confusion. No leadership, no party, no military structure, and no political organization has the moral right to treat the life of a young Tigrayan as cheap. If there are local abuses, mismanagements, or unclear practices in the name of mobilization, they must be corrected immediately. But isolated failures must not be falsely presented as the essence of Tigray’s national preparedness \u2014 or weaponized into a narrative that erases Tigray’s documented history of conviction-based struggle. But Tigray must not be demobilized either. A people that survived a genocidal war cannot be told, at this hour, that all organized preparedness is illegitimate. A society whose land remains occupied, whose displaced people remain in camps, whose economy is squeezed, whose institutions are under pressure, and whose enemies are still animated by vengeance cannot afford to dismantle its own capacity to defend itself. The question is not whether Tigray needs preparedness. It does. The question is what kind of preparedness can preserve both the dignity of the youth and the survival of the nation. The answer cannot be coercion. But it cannot be demobilization. The danger surrounding Tigray is real Any honest discussion must begin from the danger Tigray faces. Tigray is not living in a normal political environment. Western Tigray remains occupied. Displaced families remain unable to return to their homes. Federal restrictions continue to affect fuel, transport, salaries, public administration, and ordinary economic life. The Pretoria framework has not produced the basic outcomes Tigrayans were told to expect. Eritrea remains a central factor in every northern security calculation. Addis Ababa continues to frame Tigray’s political moves as threats to Ethiopian sovereignty while presenting its own pressure as constitutional order. This is not an abstract danger. It is not only a danger produced by Tigray’s weakness. It is also a danger fueled by vengeance, resentment, and the political hatred that the Prosperity Party project has directed toward Tigray. The ruling order in Addis Ababa has repeatedly treated Tigray not as a political community with rights, history, and constitutional standing, but as an enemy to be weakened, contained, humiliated, and politically erased. That hostility matters. A society facing such hostility cannot survive by wishful thinking. It cannot survive by hoping that the enemy will become reasonable simply because Tigray chooses silence. It cannot survive by confusing exhaustion with peace. And it cannot survive by allowing others to define what counts as acceptable Tigrayan action. This is why national preparedness remains necessary. But because the danger is real, the method of preparedness must be even more disciplined. A just cause can be weakened by unjust methods. A necessary defense can lose legitimacy if it is conducted without clarity, consent, accountability, and political explanation. Tigray must not imitate the coercive practices of those who tried to destroy it. Why the last mobilization cannot simply be repeated During the genocidal war, Tigray’s mobilization did not depend mainly on coercion. Its moral power came from existential clarity. People saw the danger. They understood what was happening. They knew that Tigray was facing destruction. They did not need abstract speeches to know what the war meant. The enemy had already explained it through siege, massacre, starvation, displacement, sexual violence, and territorial occupation. That is why sacrifice became meaningful. The youth did not rise because they were cattle. They rose because they understood that the survival of their people was at stake. Families gave sons and daughters not because life was cheap, but because the alternative was collective destruction. The moral relationship between society and fighter was built on recognition, not command alone. That relationship must not be broken. Today’s situation is different. The danger remains real, but the form of danger is more complex. It is slower, more political, more fragmented, more psychological, and more easily disguised. It appears through unresolved occupation, economic strangulation, diplomatic ambiguity, factional confusion, fuel restrictions, institutional pressure, and the steady normalization of Tigray’s suffering. Because the danger is less visibly concentrated than during the height of the war, the political explanation must be stronger, not weaker. The leadership cannot assume that the youth will automatically understand the objective. It must explain it. It must define the threat. It must clarify the purpose. It must identify the chain of responsibility. It must show the path from sacrifice to outcome. A young person asked to risk life has the right to know: for what, under whose command, by what legal authority, toward what objective, and with what accountability? These are not anti-struggle questions. They are the questions that distinguish national defense from blind militarization. Coercion is not discipline One of the gravest mistakes a leadership can make is to confuse coercion with discipline. Discipline is political clarity translated into organized action. Coercion is the use of force to cover the absence of clarity. Discipline produces confidence. Coercion produces fear. Discipline strengthens the bond between people and institutions. Coercion breaks that bond. Discipline creates fighters who understand why they stand. Coercion creates resentment, escape, sabotage, and moral exhaustion. Tigray does not need fear-based mobilization. It needs conviction-based preparedness. The TPLF’s historical operational culture was built on exactly that principle. At its best, it politicized sacrifice, connected people to a cause they understood, and drew its strength from conviction rather than command. That is widely documented and widely acknowledged. It does not mean the institution has been without failure. In any system operating under siege, uncertainty, and the pressures of an incomplete peace, local mismanagements can occur. Those must be corrected as the failures they are \u2014 not inflated into a political narrative that equates Tigray’s preparedness with the coercive machinery of its enemies. Where youth are approached without political explanation, that falls short of the standard Tigray has historically set for itself. Where families are left in the dark about what is happening, that too falls short. Where service \u2014 in any form \u2014 becomes associated with confusion, fear, or arbitrary command rather than shared purpose and political clarity, that is a failure of discipline, not an expression of it. Tigray’s own history demands better. Tigray’s historic strength did not come from treating its people as disposable. It came from politicizing sacrifice, giving meaning to hardship, and creating a relationship between the cause and the people. Once that relationship is damaged, no amount of command can replace it. This is why any departure from that standard must be corrected immediately. Not because Tigray does not need defense. But because Tigray does need defense. A defense built on broken trust is not defense. It is decay in uniform. Demobilization is also dangerous But the opposite danger must also be named. Some voices are no longer simply opposing coercion. They are moving toward a message that effectively tells the youth: do not fight, do not prepare, do not trust any organized call, do not believe there is a national cause, because everything is only about leadership seats and personal power. That message is not protection. It is demobilization. It is one thing to oppose coercion. That is correct and necessary. It is another thing to reduce Tigray’s survival problem to a factional effort by the TPLF’s core leadership to preserve itself, or to claim that no legitimate defense question remains. That is false and politically irresponsible. Tigray’s dangers are not imaginary. Western Tigray is not imaginary. The displacement of our people is not imaginary. Federal pressure is not imaginary. Eritrea’s role in the northern equation is not imaginary. The hatred embedded in the Prosperity Party’s political treatment of Tigray is not imaginary. The desire of our enemies to see Tigray weak, divided, exhausted, and permanently contained is not imaginary. So the correct message to the youth cannot be: there is nothing worth defending. The correct message must be: do not allow your life to be used without clarity, but do not allow your nation to be stripped of its capacity to survive. Exhaustion is not a strategy Tigray is tired. That must be acknowledged. The people have buried too many. Families have paid too much. The youth have carried burdens that no generation should be asked to carry twice. Mothers and fathers cannot be expected to hear the language of mobilization without fear. A society that has endured genocide, siege, hunger, displacement, and betrayal will naturally ask hard questions when its children are again mentioned in the language of defense. Those questions are legitimate. But exhaustion cannot become strategy. Trauma cannot become policy. Fear cannot be allowed to define the entire horizon of national action. If Tigray’s enemies are still organized, if the occupation is still in place, if displacement is still unresolved, if the federal center still uses pressure and ambiguity, then Tigray’s exhaustion must be honored without being converted into surrender. This is the difficult balance. Leadership must not abuse the people’s sacrifice. But society must not be persuaded that sacrifice itself has lost meaning. What has lost legitimacy is unclear sacrifice, imposed sacrifice, careless sacrifice, and sacrifice demanded without accountability. What remains legitimate is sacrifice tied to a clear national purpose, lawful structure, political explanation, and a real path toward protecting the people. What responsible national preparedness must now consolidate If Tigray needs preparedness, and it clearly does, then the task is not to pretend that nothing is being done. Much of the foundational work appears to be underway. The real question is whether this work is being communicated clearly, governed lawfully, socially legitimized, and tied to a strategy the people can understand and trust. Political explanation must therefore accompany the work already underway. The people must be told clearly what the threat is, what the objective is, and what forms of participation are required. Ambiguity breeds suspicion, and after everything Tigray has endured, suspicion is not weakness \u2014 it is memory. The same is true of legality and accountability. If structures are being reorganized, if communities are being asked to prepare, and if youth are being registered or mobilized in any form, the process must be governed by defined authority and visible rules. No family should be left wondering who is making decisions, why those decisions are being made, and under what responsibility. Preparedness must also continue to widen the meaning of service. Defense is not only carrying a gun. Tigray needs logistics, documentation, communications,…<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6665","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-3"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6665","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6665"}],"version-history":[{"count":14,"href":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6665\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6680,"href":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6665\/revisions\/6680"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6665"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6665"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tigrayinsights.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6665"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}