Tigray’s Constitutional Void: Why Baito Tigray (ባይቶ ወከልቲ ህዝቢ ትግራይ）Must Return, But Not As It Was

The absence of Baito is not a political gap, it is a structural vacuum that no military strength or party dominance can safely replace.

I have been in contact with a number of Tigrayan colleagues, both at home and in the diaspora, who have raised serious concerns about the idea of reconstituting the 2020 regional council. Their concerns are not trivial. They are grounded in recent experience, and they deserve to be taken seriously. At the same time, one thing remains missing from the discussion. While there is no shortage of criticism, I have yet to see a clearly articulated, structured alternative that can realistically guide political actors on the ground under current conditions. Not social media reactions, not fragmented commentary, but a coherent direction that can be implemented in practice. I remain open to such an alternative. But until it is presented with clarity and substance, we must work with the institutional reality that exists, imperfect as it may be, and shape it into something that can function under pressure.

The current situation in Tigray is often described in political or military terms. Fragmentation, internal divisions, external pressure, and uncertainty about leadership. All of that is real. But it is not the most important problem. The deeper issue is institutional. Tigray today is operating without a functioning constitutional center, and that absence is beginning to shape everything else. When a society loses its central governing structure, decisions do not stop. Authority does not disappear. It becomes informal, dispersed, and harder to account for. This is where confusion begins. Many people think the problem is about who should lead. In reality, the more urgent question is: through what structure should leadership operate?

This is where clarification is necessary. When people hear calls for the reconstitution of Baito, many interpret it as an attempt to restore the system exactly as it functioned before its disruption. That is not the argument. The Baito we are referring to is not a new institution. It is the same constitutional body whose mandate was interrupted by war and external intervention. Its legitimacy, therefore, is not in question. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the way this institution functioned prior to that disruption was shaped by a dominant political structure, and its deliberative space was limited in ways that are now widely recognized. What is being proposed is not a replacement of that institution, but its reconstitution under conditions that require it to function as an emergency constitutional authority.

This brings us to the core argument. Baito must be reconstituted not as a symbolic gesture, and not as a continuation of its previous operational form, but as an institution adapted to the current reality. Its purpose would not be to replicate normal peacetime governance. It would be to stabilize authority, create a legitimate decision-making structure, and provide a framework within which Tigray can navigate an ongoing crisis.

Some will immediately point to what happened during the war. The concentration of emergency power in a small command structure, composed of a limited number of political and military actors, without clear transparency, without institutionalized reporting, and without a functioning audit or oversight mechanism. The Baito, in that moment, did not exercise its role as a constitutional body. It ceded authority without maintaining structured control. This concern is valid. It must be stated clearly. The problem was not only what decisions were made, but how authority was structured and delegated.

Emergency power, in itself, is not the issue. In moments of existential threat, concentrated decision-making may be necessary. The failure arises when such power is not bounded, not reviewed, and not brought back into an accountable institutional framework. If Baito is to be reconstituted, this cannot be repeated. Any delegation of emergency authority must be conditional. Time-bound, mandate-specific, and subject to periodic review. Reporting cannot be optional or informal. It must be structured and required. Most importantly, the institution that delegates authority must retain the right to reassess, adjust, or withdraw that authority based on evolving conditions. This is what was missing before. And this is what must now be built into the system.

A reconstituted Baito would create a structured space where decisions are made visibly, debated within an agreed emergency framework, and anchored in a recognized authority. But this only works if the structure itself is redesigned to avoid the failures of the past. Without such redesign, reconstitution becomes repetition.

Such a process is not abstract. It requires a deliberate opening of space where political actors within Tigray, including political parties that participated in the 2020 election and civic actors with demonstrated societal standing, can engage directly in shaping the structure itself. This means that the question of transition, which many have raised, should not be dismissed, even where it appears impractical under current conditions. It should be brought into the same space of deliberation, examined against the realities on the ground, and negotiated within a framework that prioritizes functionality over ideal positioning.

In practice, this would involve assembling a structured forum under the authority of a reconstituted Baito. In that forum, these actors are not merely present. They are given a defined role in discussing mandate, authority, and process. The objective is not to eliminate disagreement. It is to bring it into an organized setting where positions are tested, adjusted, and aligned to what can realistically be implemented. For such a process to carry real weight, participation alone is not enough. It must be tied to how decisions are made.

If the reconstituted Baito is to function differently from the past, it must adopt decision rules that prevent unilateral outcomes. This means that on critical matters, decisions cannot be reduced to simple majority voting where one dominant actor determines the result. Instead, higher thresholds must be required, forcing broader agreement across different participants. This procedural requirement is not simply about inclusion. It is rooted in the nature of the current crisis.

This is not a normal legislative environment. It is an emergency context where decisions directly affect Tigray’s strategic survival. In such conditions, a decision made by a narrow majority carries real risk. Where trust is low and political authority is fragmented, a simple majority can leave the minority unconvinced and unwilling to follow. That is how internal gridlock begins. Not from disagreement itself, but from decisions that do not carry enough collective weight. Supermajority thresholds serve a different purpose in this context. They are not designed to slow down action. They are designed to ensure that critical decisions are carried by a level of agreement that makes resistance unlikely. They force alignment where fragmentation would otherwise persist.

In a council of 190 seats, such thresholds naturally create a situation where no single actor can determine outcomes alone. Decisions of consequence would require alignment beyond one political force. This creates meaningful space for other actors to matter, even where one party retains the largest share. In this way, the Baito does more than deliberate. It transforms contested positions into decisions that can be acted upon collectively. It strengthens internal cohesion at a moment when division itself becomes a strategic vulnerability. Only through such a process can Tigray convert constraint into strategic position.

To understand why this matters, we must return to the present political moment. The situation is being framed as if TPLF is left with two bad options, both leading to advantage for Abiy Ahmed. That framing is understandable. But it is incomplete. It assumes that the only actors that matter are TPLF and Abiy Ahmed, and that the outcome depends on which side gains advantage. But this is not the real problem we are facing. The real problem is that Tigray is currently operating without a strong institutional structure that can absorb pressure, organize authority, and define direction.

As long as decisions are made in a fragmented and reactive way, every move can be turned into an advantage for Abiy. Not because the options themselves are inherently bad, but because they are being exercised without structure. The question, therefore, is not whether to accept or reject General Tadesse. The question is how to position him within a system that serves Tigray’s collective interest. Trying to sideline him creates confrontation under weak conditions. Accepting him without structure creates vulnerability. Both are risky because both operate outside an institutional framework. What is required at this stage is not a rushed decision between these options. It is a deliberate effort to move beyond them through a structured process that reestablishes coordinated authority.

This is why the immediate priority should not be confrontation or passive acceptance. It should be the creation of conditions for structured dialogue. Not dialogue as a formality, but as a mechanism to realign actors, clarify mandates, and rebuild a basis for coordinated action. This brings us back to the role of Baito. A reconstituted parliament, completed through deliberate inclusion and governed by structured decision rules, can provide exactly this kind of space. Such an institution would not eliminate disagreement. It would organize it. It would not assume trust. It would function despite its absence.

Without a central structure, authority will continue to disperse, and external actors will continue to shape outcomes. With it, Tigray regains the ability to define its own process, even under pressure. The choice, therefore, is not between restoring the past and rejecting it. It is between operating with structure or without it. Only one of these paths allows Tigray to act, rather than react.