The Pretoria Vacuum: Turning ጽምዶ “Tsim’do” into Strategic Leverage

… ጽምዶ is not a deviation from a peace process; it is a response to the vacuum created when that process is left unfulfilled.

In my earlier opinion pieces, I have tried to clarify what ጽምዶ is and what it is not, why it should not be confused with trust, reconciliation, or ideological convergence, and why it must instead be understood as a strategic necessity shaped by the realities Tigray faces. I do not want to repeat those arguments here. What concerns me now is something more immediate and more practical: how this idea can begin to translate into relief for a society that is increasingly under pressure.

Before going further, however, one point must be stated clearly. The grave situation in Tigray today is not accidental, nor is it inevitable. It is the direct result of the failure to implement the Pretoria Agreement in good faith. Had its core provisions: restoration of constitutional order, return of displaced populations, withdrawal of occupying forces, and normalization of basic services, been carried out as agreed, Tigray would not be facing this level of social and economic strain. The current condition is not a post-conflict recovery phase; it is a condition shaped by incomplete and unfulfilled peace.

It is precisely within this absence that ጽምዶ becomes necessary. Not as a replacement for the Pretoria framework, and not in contradiction to it, but as a supplement born out of its non-implementation. In other words, ጽምዶ is not a deviation from a peace process; it is a response to the vacuum created when that process is left unfulfilled. It is an attempt by Tigray to find ways, however limited and imperfect, to coexist with its neighbors and to reduce pressure on its people while the formal mechanisms that were meant to guarantee stability remain inactive.

What I find increasingly important now is to move beyond explaining this necessity and to begin thinking about how it can be applied. Because the situation in Tigray today is no longer defined simply by a gradual tightening of conditions, but by the point at which that gradual pressure has reached its limit. Medical supplies are no longer just diminishing; in many cases, they are exhausted. Fuel is not merely constrained; it is largely unavailable. Budgetary support is not delayed; it is absent. Public institutions are not only weakening; they are struggling to function. What began as slow pressure has now reached a level where its effects are fully visible. And that is precisely what makes this moment dangerous.

In such a situation, the role of policy cannot be to wait for full solutions. It must be to identify where pressure can be reduced, even slightly, and to act in those spaces with care. This is where ጽምዶ must begin to change its form. It can no longer remain at the level of strategic positioning alone. It must become a working instrument, capable of producing small but meaningful effects in a constrained environment.

This requires a shift in how we think about action. Not in terms of large agreements or visible breakthroughs, but in terms of narrow openings that can be created without exposing Tigray to new risks. A border that remains calm rather than tense, a channel of communication that is maintained rather than interrupted, a movement that is tolerated rather than blocked, these are not outcomes that attract attention, but they are precisely the kinds of adjustments that begin to soften a rigid situation. And in a context like the current one, softening matters.

At the same time, such openings must be approached with a clear understanding of their limits, especially in relation to Eritrea. Tigray’s need to engage is driven by immediate social and economic pressure. Eritrea’s behavior, however, is shaped by its own internal and strategic considerations. These are not necessarily aligned. At best, they intersect under specific conditions, and even then only temporarily. This is why any attempt to translate ጽምዶ into practice must be handled with caution, discipline, and a constant awareness that engagement does not eliminate risk.

Our history reinforces this point. During the 1984–85 famine, when Tigrayans depended on routes toward Sudan for survival, access through Eritrean-controlled areas did not follow humanitarian logic. It followed political calculation. When relations deteriorated, passage was restricted, and civilians were forced onto longer and more dangerous routes. That experience is not simply something to remember; it is something to learn from. It reminds us that engagement without preparation can expose vulnerability, and that necessity, if not managed carefully, can be turned into leverage by others.

This is why I insist that what is required now is not simply engagement, but skillful engagement. Tigray cannot afford either isolation or dependency. It must operate in a space between the two, where every interaction is conditional, limited, and reversible. The objective is not to transform relationships, but to reduce friction enough to allow minimal flow. If that flow begins, even in small measure, it can have real effects: a supply that reaches a hospital, a service that continues to function, a pressure that does not escalate further. These are not solutions, but they are relief – and relief, in the present moment, is strategic.

At this point, I also feel the need to underline something that may appear minor but is, in fact, central to the success of this approach. I have observed that some of our cadres, especially those involved in propaganda, have gone too far in their language, portraying Shabia, Isaias, or the PFDJ in overly positive terms. This risks undermining the balance that ጽምዶ requires. Skillful engagement does not mean endorsement, nor does it justify language that normalizes or softens systems and individuals associated with grave crimes against our people. Our words must remain measured, disciplined, and consistent with our strategic position. In this regard, it is also worth noting how Eritrean propagandists operate: their language remains tightly aligned with their objectives. We must match that discipline. Because in a situation like ours, words are not separate from action, they are part of the instrument itself.

At the same time, this quiet and careful work must be matched by clarity in other areas. Tigray must speak more directly to the outside world. Before the end of President Tadesse Worede’s term, there is a strong case for TIRA to organize a high-level press conference, either in Mekelle or Addis Ababa, to present a structured and evidence-based account of the situation on the ground. The aim should not be to restate grievances, but to communicate reality: what is running out, where systems are under strain, and what risks are emerging. Without such clarity, the absence of visible crisis can easily be mistaken for stability.

In parallel, engagement with the federal government, as well as with actors in Amhara and Afar, must continue, not as a search for immediate resolution, but as a way of preventing the accumulation of pressure from multiple directions. Tigray does not have the capacity to absorb simultaneous escalation across all fronts. Even partial stabilization in one area creates space in another. This is not a concession. It is a necessity.
Ultimately, the challenge before Tigray is not to find a perfect path, but to navigate an imperfect one with discipline and awareness. The failure of the Pretoria Agreement has left a gap that cannot be ignored. ጽምዶ, in this context, is one of the ways Tigray attempts to operate within that gap, not as a replacement for peace, but as a means of sustaining life in its absence.

If it is to succeed, it will not be through declarations or explanations, but through effect. It will be measured in small shifts: pressures reduced, systems sustained, risks contained. And achieving that will require something that cannot be improvised, a level of political skill that matches the complexity of the moment.