The Political Illness in Tigray: Diagnosing and Addressing the Crisis Within the TPLF

1. Preface

This analysis represents a personal perspective from a technical professional born and raised in Addis Ababa, who later began his career in Tigray in the mid-1990s and spent significant time living and working there. Nowadays, in an era dominated by social media, where individuals from all walks of life actively share their reflections—some even shaping public opinion as social activists—it is easy to overlook the perspectives of the silent majority. These are professionals who keenly observe events but often refrain from expressing their insights openly.

I consider myself part of this silent majority, choosing to analyze and interpret the unfolding political and social dynamics with thoughtfulness rather than immediacy. As the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) commemorates its 50th anniversary, this milestone serves as a poignant reminder of the sacrifices made and the resilience shown by Tigrayans throughout history. It is also an opportunity to reflect on the challenges that lie ahead and to chart a path forward that honors this legacy while addressing present realities.

This opinion piece offers a non-traditional perspective, distinct from the dominant voices on social platforms. While I aim to contribute to meaningful discussions and inspire actionable insights for addressing the challenges facing Tigray, I remain keen to learn from others. If any of my views or perspectives are flawed, incorrect, or incomplete, I welcome constructive feedback and am eager to learn from my shortcomings.

2. Introduction: The Post-Genocide Political Crisis in Tigray

The slow disintegration of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) marked the beginning of Ethiopia’s current political crisis. Once a formidable coalition, EPRDF’s internal fractures became evident following the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, whose leadership had held together the coalition’s disparate factions. While centralization of power, growing tensions between member parties, and the inability to address Ethiopia’s shifting socio-political landscape contributed to its decline, a deeper factor lay in the growing animosity towards the TPLF and Tigrayans in general.

This animosity was fueled by several interrelated factors. One was the widespread perception—false yet persistent—that Tigrayans disproportionately benefited from EPRDF’s rule. This narrative, amplified by political rhetoric, painted Tigrayans as the primary beneficiaries of Ethiopia’s economic and political progress, sparking resentment among other ethnic groups. Another key factor was resistance to the ethnic federalism introduced by EPRDF, which empowered Ethiopia’s nations and nationalities to exercise their cultures and languages. Many within the Amhara elite viewed this as a threat to the historical dominance of Amharic culture and identity, fueling opposition to the TPLF’s leadership.

Adding to this animosity was the role played by segments of the Amhara diaspora, particularly those educated during the Haile Selassie and Derg regimes and residing in the U.S., Europe, and Australia. Motivated by a desire to restore a centralized Ethiopian state and counter the ethnic federalism policies introduced by the EPRDF, these groups became key agents in amplifying anti-TPLF and anti-Tigrayan rhetoric. They actively supported opposition organizations, such as the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF), which rejected the Transitional Government established by the EPRDF and operated in exile. Leveraging their positions within international organizations and influence in their adopted countries, these diaspora elements engaged in lobbying efforts, disseminated anti-EPRDF narratives, and mobilized resources to challenge the Ethiopian government’s policies under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Their campaigns significantly shaped international perceptions of the EPRDF and TPLF, contributing to the broader narrative of resentment and mistrust that isolated Tigrayans both domestically and internationally. These factors collectively stoked animosity, isolating Tigrayans and TPLF alike, and set the stage for the targeted discrimination and persecution that escalated under Hailemariam Desalegn and Abiy Ahmed’s administrations.

During Hailemariam Desalegn’s tenure, anti-Tigrayan sentiment intensified across Ethiopia. Tigrayans faced systemic discrimination, including arbitrary detentions, harassment, and disowning of properties, in some instances, brutal killings. Reports from human rights organizations documented increasing hostility, as Tigrayans were treated as scapegoats for Ethiopia’s political and economic challenges. This environment fostered widespread marginalization, creating deep fractures within EPRDF as member parties distanced themselves from TPLF, further eroding the coalition’s cohesion. Under Abiy Ahmed’s leadership, these discriminatory practices became more systematic. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have detailed how Tigrayans in Addis Ababa and elsewhere were subjected to mass detentions, forced disappearances, and ethnically motivated targeting. This orchestrated campaign not only deepened the alienation of Tigrayans but also confined the TPLF’s influence to Tigray, isolating it politically and strategically.

Perhaps most deeply ingrained reason for the animosity was the discomfort many Ethiopians felt toward what they perceived as the ‘higher moral authority’ of Tigrayans. Tigrayans have historically been perceived as assertive, disciplined, and principled—a disposition that has occasionally clashed with broader societal norms in Ethiopia. These traits, while often viewed positively, have also contributed to the misperceptions and resentment directed toward them. These dynamics fueled widespread resentment toward Tigrayans, culminating in systematic marginalization and targeted actions under successive administrations. The resulting isolation of Tigrayans and the TPLF underscored Ethiopia’s deepening socio-political fractures.

From 2013/14 onward, many Tigrayan families who had lived for decades across Ethiopia, including in Addis Ababa, were forced to resettle in Tigray. These families and individuals, often dispossessed of their hard-earned livelihoods and properties, returned with little to nothing in their hands. This wave of resettlement, marked by dispossession and displacement, particularly affected young Tigrayans, who faced systemic discrimination and economic marginalization. These experiences underscored the deep pain and hardships endured by Tigrayans over the past decade, further compounding their collective struggles.

Returning to Tigray, the TPLF sought to redefine itself and chart a new course for the region. With a focus on reconstruction and leveraging Tigray’s human capital, the party aimed to modernize infrastructure, improve governance, and foster regional development. However, this period of renewal was overshadowed by escalating tensions with Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party (PP). As Abiy sought to consolidate power, TPLF’s resistance to federal overreach led to a growing rift, culminating in political hostility, mutual distrust, and escalating tensions.

The growing tensions between PP and TPLF set the stage for one of Ethiopia’s darkest chapters—the genocidal war against Tigray. The conflict, meticulously planned and executed, brought catastrophic destruction to the region, leaving deep scars on its society, economy, and political institutions. Abiy was determined not only to crush the TPLF and weaken Tigray’s social and economic capacity—infamously stating an intent to “rewind Tigray back by 100 years”—but also to occupy legitimate Tigrayan lands. Western and Southern Tigray were handed to Amhara forces, while Eritrea took control of northern and northwestern areas. This deliberate redistribution of land was designed to sow deep and lasting animosity between Tigrayans and their neighbors, ensuring a strategically advantageous position for Abiy and the Oromo leadership’s long-term goals.

Nearly a third of Tigray’s territory remains under occupation by external forces, with hundreds of thousands of displaced Tigrayans languishing in temporary camps scattered across the region. These camps, plagued by inadequate resources and dire living conditions, reflect the failure to address the humanitarian crisis comprehensively. The war’s aftermath underscored the urgent need for a resolution to the ongoing displacement and the restoration of Tigray’s territorial integrity.

The Pretoria Agreement, which brought about a cessation of hostilities, marked a critical turning point. While the agreement halted large-scale violence, it also underscored the impossibility of a total military victory for either side. For Tigray, represented by the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and TPLF, the agreement was an opportunity to regroup and address urgent humanitarian needs. For Abiy, however, it marked a tactical pause—an opportunity to ensure the long-term weakening of TPLF and Tigray. His broader strategy was not aimed at reasserting federal control but rather at confining and suffocating TPLF, calculating that a weakened Tigray would remain incapable of regaining its pre-war potential for decades to come. This perspective, frequently echoed by his supporters, reflects a calculated effort to sideline Tigray from Ethiopia’s political and economic future entirely. Abiy Ahmed’s administration systematically exploited the vulnerabilities of the TPLF through a calculated divide-and-rule strategy, as detailed in reports by Human Rights Watch and other observers. By amplifying internal divisions, his administration further destabilized Tigray’s leadership, weakening its political cohesion and diminishing its capacity to challenge federal authority (Human Rights Watch, 2023; Al Jazeera, 2023).

The Pretoria Agreement was facilitated by the United States, the African Union, and other international partners with good intentions, as reflected in the establishment of the interim administration. While the interim administration was envisioned as a mechanism for inclusive governance, incorporating TPLF members, civic associations, diaspora representatives, and opposition groups, Abiy Ahmed’s agreement to this framework was never in good faith. For both TPLF/TDF and Abiy, the agreement essentially served as a time-buying mechanism—a pause to strategize on how to deal with one another. For Tigrayans, the cessation of hostilities brought a much-needed reprieve, allowing humanitarian aid to reach large parts of the region, but the agreement was met with widespread dissatisfaction. Abiy, on the other hand, viewed it as an opportunity to consolidate his long-term plans to weaken Tigray. He showed no intent to return Tigray’s sovereign territories, nor to compel external forces, including Eritrean troops, to withdraw to pre-war positions. This lack of commitment to the agreement’s spirit has undermined the interim administration’s effectiveness and left Tigray’s displacement and sovereignty issues unresolved. Instead, it has been paralyzed by internal factionalism and external pressures, undermining its ability to restore Tigray’s sovereignty or address the displacement crisis.

At the heart of this paralysis lies the TPLF, a political party that once epitomized discipline, ideological coherence, and transformative leadership. Today, the TPLF faces unprecedented challenges, including ideological drift, mistrust among its leadership, and a loss of public trust. These struggles reflect deeper structural issues within the party, such as its recruitment practices and organizational dynamics, which have failed to adapt to the changing political landscape. Still employing divide-and-rule tactics, Abiy has systematically undermined TPLF’s push for autonomy and its ability to maintain political cohesion. These actions are part of a broader strategy to centralize power and diminish regional voices in Ethiopia’s federal structure, leaving the TPLF on the defensive as it struggles to address both internal and external threats.

This paper seeks to unpack these systemic challenges, analyze the broader political dynamics shaping Tigray’s current crisis, and explore potential pathways for renewal and stability. By understanding the flaws within the TPLF and their implications for Tigray’s survival, we can gain insights into the broader challenges of political party dynamics in post-conflict societies.

3. Factionalism within TPLF

3.1 TPLF: A Revolutionary Movement in Transition

After its successful overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, the TPLF transitioned from a revolutionary movement to a central governing force within the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). This transformation required TPLF to adapt its leadership style, recruit new members, and navigate the complex political dynamics of governing a diverse nation. The transition was fraught with challenges, particularly in mobilizing the human capital necessary to implement its political objectives and sustain its ideological vision.

In the early 1990s, TPLF’s internal restructuring differentiated between combatants and cadres. Combatants, who had fought in the armed struggle, were either integrated into the newly formed Ethiopian National Defense Forces or encouraged to return to civilian life in Tigray. Cadres, however, were expected to carry forward TPLF’s political mission, implementing its objectives across Ethiopia. While many cadres demonstrated loyalty and commitment to the party, they often lacked the political skills and ideological clarity required for their roles. The legacy of these combatants, however, remains deeply intertwined with Tigray’s ongoing resistance. Today, the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) are led predominantly by these former TPLF combatants, many of whom were relieved of political responsibilities but retained their military expertise. Although TDF has drawn fighters from all walks of life, the command structure reflects the foundational role of these early combatants, making it difficult for both Tigrayans and outsiders to fully disassociate TDF from TPLF.

3.2 Structural Weaknesses in Leadership and Recruitment

The challenges of recruiting effective political talent were compounded by the natural diversity of human interests and capabilities. Some individuals excelled in professions or business, while others gravitated toward public responsibility, regardless of whether they possessed the necessary skills or capacity. TPLF often recruited individuals from the latter category—those drawn to public engagement but not always equipped to navigate its complexities.

My own experience underscores this dynamic. As a professional, I was approached to join TPLF in the 1990s, but I declined for several reasons. I valued my independence, preferred to work as an independent professional, and hesitated to participate in activities that did not align with my beliefs. Many Tigrayan professionals—what I call the “silent majority”—shared similar sentiments. These were individuals who contributed to society through their expertise but chose to remain outside the political apparatus.

Many cadres recruited during this period lacked the political acumen needed to fulfill their roles effectively. This challenge extended to EPRDF at large, where TPLF’s emphasis on equitable ethnic participation often resulted in the promotion of cadres who were loyal but not necessarily skilled. Over time, this created vulnerabilities within the organization, leaving it ill-equipped to address Ethiopia’s evolving political landscape.

3.3 The Emergence of a Faction

These structural weaknesses, rooted in TPLF’s recruitment dynamics and leadership challenges, laid the groundwork for internal dissent. The seeds of factionalism were sown even within EPRDF, particularly after the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. In the years following his leadership, internal divisions began to surface as some officials openly criticized the policies and governance of EPRDF. This behavior prompted a common saying among TPLF supporters: “Were you ተላላኪ (just a messenger) then?”—a rhetorical question aimed at those who distanced themselves from the party by declaring EPRDF’s era as the darkest, የጨለማ ዘመን, in Ethiopia’s history. This critique reflects the lingering consequences of undervaluing recruitment processes and promoting cadres who lacked political conviction or depth.

In recent years, a small but vocal faction within TPLF has openly opposed the party’s leadership, undermining its internal cohesion. This faction, composed mainly of upper- and mid-level cadres, emerged in the wake of the genocidal war’s aftermath, exploiting the disillusionment of constituents and party members alike. Its rise reflects not only TPLF’s internal vulnerabilities but also external efforts to weaken Tigray’s political influence.

3.4 Triggers and Motives

While earlier sections highlighted the flaws in TPLF/EPRDF’s cadre recruitment process and their role in the party’s decline, it is equally important to analyze the broader triggers that have exacerbated factionalism within TPLF. These triggers go beyond recruitment dynamics, encompassing a range of internal and external pressures that have reshaped the party’s cohesion and focus. To provide a more comprehensive understanding, these triggers are categorized into key areas that collectively reveal the depth of TPLF’s challenges.

1. External Manipulation: Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party, particularly its Oromo faction, has played a significant role in fomenting divisions within TPLF. Abiy’s administration seeks to destabilize Tigray and diminish TPLF’s influence by providing covert support to disgruntled elements.
2. Ideological Drift: TPLF’s ideological clarity has waned over the years. The departure from its foundational principles has alienated many members, enabling factions to exploit this vacuum.
3. Economic Hardship: The war’s catastrophic economic impact created fertile ground for dissent. With constituents demanding immediate solutions, faction leaders have positioned themselves as reformists, leveraging grievances to build support.
4. Personal Ambitions: Certain faction leaders are self-interest-driven, prioritizing personal gains and power over collective party goals.

3.5 Implications for Tigray’s Political Landscape

The rise of factionalism within TPLF has profound implications for Tigray’s political future. Internally, it has disrupted the party’s ability to present a united front, weakening its organizational cohesion and diminishing its effectiveness. Externally, it has emboldened efforts to marginalize Tigray politically, reducing its influence in Ethiopia and to the whole region at large.

This interplay between internal weaknesses and external manipulations highlights the urgent need for TPLF to address its structural flaws. Without a concerted effort to rebuild trust, enhance political capacity, and foster unity, the party risks further erosion of its leadership and relevance. For Tigray, the stakes are high: its survival as a cohesive political and social entity depends on its ability to navigate these challenges and reclaim its voice in Ethiopia’s political discourse.

4. Strategic Goals of Abiy Ahmed and the Prosperity Party

4.1 Motivations and Aspirations: A Personality Shaped by Conflict and Ideology

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s motivations and ultimate objectives can be traced to a complex interplay of personal identity, upbringing, and the socio-political dynamics that shaped modern Ethiopia. His ascent to power and subsequent governance strategies reflect deeply rooted personal frustrations, identity struggles, and calculated political maneuvers to redefine Ethiopia’s political and social fabric.

1. Personal Identity and Frustrations

Abiy Ahmed’s personal story, as understood from various sources, reflects a journey of internal conflict and soul-searching. Born into a multicultural context, with his mother of Amhara origin and an alleged Eritrean biological father, his upbringing was primarily shaped by Oromo culture under the care of his stepfather, Ahmod Ali. This layered identity, coupled with revelations about his paternal lineage, reportedly caused significant inner turmoil. Navigating these multiple identities during his formative years is believed to have instilled a deep sense of frustration and a yearning to assert his place in Ethiopia’s complex socio-political hierarchy.

In the years leading up to Abiy’s ascent to power, particularly around 2017 and 2018, whispers among close associates and observers suggested that he grappled with unresolved identity issues. Rumors circulated that he knew his biological father was Eritrean, a fact that reportedly deepened his sense of personal uncertainty. This and his perceived animosity toward Tigrayans created a complex backdrop for his rise. However, Abiy skillfully suppressed these rumors upon assuming office, silencing those who might have exposed them publicly. This strategic containment shielded his image and bolstered his ability to consolidate power in a politically volatile environment.

His mother’s prophetic claim that he would one day become the “7th king of Ethiopia” further fueled his ambitions, providing a psychological anchor for his aspirations. While such prophecies hold cultural significance in Ethiopia, they also shape personalities that seek validation and authority on a national scale.

1. Motivations Rooted in Envy and Historical Grievances

Since overthrowing the Derg regime, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Tigrayans, in general, have been viewed as a dominant force in Ethiopia’s political and economic landscape. Their ability to establish significant socio-economic progress and command substantial political influence has been a source of envy and contention among other ethnic groups, including the Oromo and Amhara elites. Abiy’s motivations appear intertwined with these dynamics.

Around 2015, I had the opportunity to engage with professionals at the Information Network Security Agency (INSA) on telecom and geospatial projects, I observed a notable pattern: non-Tigrayan participation in critical discussions often remained passive. This passivity, whether due to lack of confidence, preparation, or systemic cultural factors, inadvertently amplified the perception of Tigrayan dominance. Abiy Ahmed, who was present during some of these encounters, exemplified this passivity. At the time, I paid little attention to him, but in hindsight, his subdued role during such critical discussions might have influenced his later motivations and strategies.

Reflecting on personal experiences during my tenure at Mekelle University as a researcher and lecturer, I had the opportunity to interact extensively with various ranks and files, academic elites, employees, and professionals in both government and non-government organizations across Ethiopia. Traveling frequently between Mekelle and other regions, I observed that while many non-Tigrayans appeared to appreciate the rationality and effectiveness of policies and programs under the EPRDF-led government, there was an unspoken discomfort regarding the perception that these policies were primarily articulated and championed by Tigrayans.

This discomfort, often unvoiced but palpable in social interactions, seemed rooted not in disagreement with the policies themselves but in the visibility and dominance of Tigrayans in high-level discussions and decision-making. Growing up in Addis Ababa, a multicultural metropolitan city, perhaps I developed an instinct for sensing such undercurrents in people’s feelings. At Mekelle University, where I worked closely with Amhara and Oromo colleagues who lived on campus and considered Mekelle their home, I noticed they often felt conflicted. While they enjoyed being part of the Tigrayan community, their conversations hinted at a subtle perception of Tigrayan superiority.

To my utter surprise, many of these same colleagues—who had academically grown in Mekelle, obtaining master’s and PhD degrees and later leveraging those credentials to secure positions in NGOs, including CGIAR organizations, were among the staunchest supporters and advocates of the genocidal war against Tigray. Their opinions, widely shared on social media and government platforms, revealed shocking and painful betrayal. Witnessing such blasphemy and ክህደት (treachery) from individuals who had directly benefited from Tigray’s institutions adds another layer of complexity to understanding the dynamics of resentment and opposition toward Tigrayans.

Interestingly, reality often contradicted this perception. Some higher administrative positions within Mekelle University were held by non-Tigrayans, including Amhara’s and Oromo’s, reflecting a deliberate inclusivity. However, in higher-level meetings, especially in Addis Ababa, Tigrayan representatives frequently dominated discussions, presenting well-articulated arguments and passionately advocating for their points. Their dominance in such settings, while often based on merit and preparation, sometimes alienated other participants who felt overshadowed or marginalized.

I remember voicing my concerns to Tigrayan colleagues and officials, arguing that this tendency to dominate discussions, while unintentional, risked creating resentment. In many heated off-meeting exchanges with senior Tigrayan officials, I criticized their approach, suggesting they encourage broader participation and foster inclusivity in discussions. Although their intentions were often rooted in a desire for excellence and progress, the cumulative effect of these dynamics contributed to a perception of arrogance or exclusivity.

One of the negative character traits often observed among Tigrayans, particularly amplified in TPLF cadres and the academic elite, is an inherent confidence that can border on arrogance. This confidence, stemming from the TPLF struggle and its successes, has instilled a belief that Tigrayans hold the moral and intellectual high ground. While this has contributed to a better understanding of democratic ideologies, especially in the post-1991 generation, it has also fostered a perception that others’ views are less valid or practical. This sense of superiority, while unintentional, often alienates those with differing perspectives and has contributed to cumulative sentiments of resentment. In hindsight, this dynamic played a role in the eventual demise of the EPRDF and now threatens the cohesion of the TPLF itself.

This longstanding resentment toward Tigrayans provided fertile ground for individuals and movements to exploit anti-Tigrayan sentiment for political gain. Among the most significant figures in this dynamic are Jawar Mohammed, Andargachew Tsige, and Berhanu Nega. Each played a critical role in amplifying narratives that targeted TPLF and the federalist system it championed. Jawar, through the Kero movement, catalyzed the dismantling of the EPRDF and laid the groundwork for the genocidal war against Tigray. Andargachew and Berhanu, leaders of movements like Ginbot 7, openly opposed TPLF’s governance, portraying it as corrupt and divisive. Their rhetoric, which long predated Abiy Ahmed’s rise, found alignment with his agenda, making them key allies in the genocidal mission against Tigray. This convergence of actors, despite differing ideologies, epitomizes how anti-Tigrayan sentiment became a unifying force in Ethiopia’s political trajectory.

Particularly, Jawar Mohammed, a key ‘architect’ of the EPRDF’s demise, leveraged widespread dissatisfaction and anti-Tigrayan rhetoric to propel Abiy Ahmed to power through the Kero movement in Oromia. His vocal opposition to Tigrayans and EPRDF policies galvanized a political shift that dismantled the coalition. Yet, after Abiy consolidated power, he swiftly turned on Jawar, imprisoning him and forcing him into exile—a move that exposed the opportunistic nature of their alliance. Ironically, Jawar has recently resurfaced, advocating for a federalist ideology that echoes the principles of EPRDF he once opposed. Whether this shift reflects genuine conviction or aligns with the “Confuse and Convince” strategy articulated by Oromia leaders like Shimelis Abdissa is difficult to discern. It may be part of a broader aspiration to cement Oromo dominance in Ethiopia’s political, economic, and cultural landscape.

This evolution underscores the misguided nature of the animosity toward Tigrayans and their contributions. While proponents of anti-Tigray and anti-Tigrayan sentiment have shifted their narratives and positions to suit political expediency, Tigrayans’ historical focus on equitable governance and regional development reflected aspirations for a just federal structure. However, the betrayal and genocidal war inflicted upon Tigray and its people necessitate a fundamental re-evaluation of this ideology. It is no longer in Tigray’s interest to uphold the federalist principles it once championed. The lessons of the past few years demand a decisive pivot, with Tigray turning its focus Northward—toward self-reliance and safeguarding its future. This ideological shift is not a retreat but a necessary adaptation to the realities imposed by the Ethiopian state’s repeated failure to protect Tigray’s people and rights.

• Strategic Use of Ethiopianist Ideology

Abiy Ahmed’s promotion of “Ethiopianism” has been a central theme in his political narrative, aiming to transcend ethnic divisions and foster a unified national identity. Some have interpreted this approach, and I believe that too, as a response to his personal identity complexities, given his mixed heritage, providing a platform that integrates his Amhara, Oromo, and Eritrean connections into a cohesive vision. However, critics argue that this ideology serves as a strategic facade to further political ambitions, particularly the marginalization of the Tigrayan political elite and the consolidation of his authority.

Despite his rhetoric of unity, Abiy’s actions have often contradicted the principles of Ethiopianism. His administration has been marked by policies and military campaigns that have exacerbated ethnic tensions rather than alleviating them. Notably, the conflict in the Amhara region, where federal forces have clashed with local militias, underscores the dissonance between his proclaimed ideals and the realities on the ground. Reports indicate that the government’s military campaigns in the Amhara region have led to significant civilian casualties and displacement, further straining ethnic relations.

While Abiy handed vast tracts of Western and Southern Tigrayan lands to the Amhara during his genocidal war in Tigray—garnering him overwhelming support from Amhara elites at the time—this alliance now appears to have fractured. The Amhara seem to have awakened from the delusion that Abiy’s actions aligned with their long-term interests. Instead, they have come to realize that he used their support to further his own strategic vision, ultimately shifting gears to fuel a long-term social, economic, and political weakening of the Amhara polity. This is evident in the vicious military campaigns, drone-enabled operations, and significant resource allocation aimed at suppressing resistance in the Amhara region.

The recent conflicts in the Amhara region have laid bare the fragility of Abiy’s Ethiopianist ideology. While promoting unity, his administration has weaponized Ethiopianism to blackmail Amhara and other nationalities into compliance, leveraging the rhetoric of a unified state to justify oppressive actions. This narrative also serves as a cover for advancing hidden agendas, particularly the Oromo Prosperity Party’s increasing dominance. Underreported but significant, the party has been imposing its will across many parts of the Southern Nations and Nationalities, marginalizing local voices and sowing seeds of future ethnic and social crises. These actions, while masked by Ethiopianist rhetoric, are setting the stage for widespread unrest that could one day erupt into full-blown conflicts, further jeopardizing national stability.

Equally concerning is the trajectory unfolding in the Ethiopian Somali region. Despite the turbulence of the greater Somalia crisis, the Ethiopian Somalis have historically maintained a tenuous relationship with the Ethiopian state. Many within the region do not see themselves as Ethiopians, a sentiment rooted in cultural and historical ties to Somalia rather than Ethiopia. Abiy’s approach to the region, marked by neglect and political mismanagement, has done little to address these underlying tensions. The lack of a cohesive strategy to integrate the Ethiopian Somali region into the broader national framework risks escalating the volatility in a region already fraught with instability. With Abiy’s administration seemingly oblivious to these dynamics, Ethiopia may soon face a critical juncture in the Somali region, where unchecked grievances could ignite a larger crisis that threatens Ethiopia’s territorial integrity.

Abiy, since ascending to power, has repeatedly proclaimed that “Ethiopia shall never disintegrate” (“ኢትዮጵያ አትፈረስም”). Yet, his actions raise fundamental questions about what he truly means by this statement. His government has failed to articulate policies or strategies that would safeguard national unity. The current EPRDF constitution remains the sole guardian of Ethiopia’s federal structure, but Abiy seems intent on rewriting it to fit his own ambitions. While he aggressively pursues divisive and autocratic approaches, no clear vision or framework exists to achieve his stated goal. Paradoxically, the very leader who claims to protect Ethiopia from disintegration is actively accelerating it through his policies and actions.

The perception that the TPLF/EPRDF was a threat to a unified Ethiopia is another misguided narrative, deeply rooted in the animosity that many Ethiopians harbor toward Tigray and Tigrayans. Abiy skillfully weaponized this sentiment to rise to power and consolidate his authority, portraying himself as the savior of Ethiopian unity. Tragically, the opposite has proven true. His tenure has only deepened ethnic divisions, weakened the federal structure, and pushed the country closer to fragmentation.

Today, the grim reality is that Ethiopia is disintegrating slowly but surely (“ኢትዮጵያ ግን ቀስ እያለች እየፈረሰች ነው።”). Whether this trajectory is reversible remains uncertain. For me, however, this unraveling feels final—“for good.”

1. Divide-and-Rule: Strategic Tactics to Undermine the TPLF

Abiy Ahmed’s administration’s systematic efforts to neutralize the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) began with dissolving the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition. By excluding the TPLF and marginalizing its role in federal politics, Abiy effectively confined the party to its regional stronghold in Mekelle. This was followed by a calculated purge of Tigrayans from Ethiopia’s military and security apparatus, further weakening the TPLF’s institutional foothold. Collaborating with Isayas Afeworki’s regime in Eritrea, Abiy orchestrated a genocidal war that brought catastrophic destruction to Tigray, devastating its people and livelihoods. Eritrea’s involvement added a brutal dimension to the conflict, with reports⁷ of widespread atrocities exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and undermining Tigray’s resistance.

Despite these aggressive measures, Abiy and his allies failed to fully dismantle the TPLF. The TPLF’s resilience forced the Ethiopian government to sign the Pretoria agreement, resulting in a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a transitional government in Tigray with the TPLF as the majority stakeholder. Abiy allowed this transition, likely miscalculating the TPLF’s ability to regain its footing. His actions also appeared aimed at placating the international community by projecting an image of a genuine peace partner.

Abiy’s covert actions immediately following the Pretoria agreement aimed to undermine the TPLF further. His approach involved incubating localized grievances to cultivate resentment against the TPLF. This strategy relied on identifying individuals and groups dissatisfied with the party’s leadership and providing financial and material support to amplify their grievances. He assembled various Tigrayans in Addis Ababa and other regions, including Amhara and Oromia, to establish localized political parties under the Ethiopian Election Commission. These included attempts to create political assemblies in the names of Tembien, Raya, and Enderta, among others. Despite significant funding and resources, these efforts largely failed due to the deeply unified societal fabric of Tigrayans that resisted such fragmentation, rendering this strategy largely ineffective.

With the establishment of the transitional administration, the TPLF engaged in a series of lengthy and frequent meetings throughout 2023 and 2024. These sessions were ostensibly meant to reflect on the ideological, political, and military failures that had led to Tigray’s devastation. However, these meetings, lacking clearly defined objectives or actionable deliverables, quickly became a source of frustration for Tigrayans. Many citizens, reeling from the aftermath of war, saw the meetings as disconnected from the immediate needs of the people—namely, the restoration of Tigray’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the resettlement of displaced Tigrayans from Sudan and internally. Internally, these prolonged discussions brewed mistrust among the highest ranks of the TPLF, creating vulnerabilities that Abiy Ahmed’s administration was quick to exploit. The absence of tangible outcomes and the growing mistrust opened back doors for external manipulation, further destabilizing the party.

Failing to achieve his goals through localized grievances, Abiy adopted a divide-and-rule approach as a more insidious tool. This strategy targeted the TPLF’s internal dynamics, exploiting vulnerabilities within its ranks. Financial incentives, material support, and covert operations became key tools in encouraging dissenting voices to challenge the party’s leadership. These tactics sowed mistrust among TPLF members, further eroding the party’s ability to present a united front against external threats. The resulting divisions not only weakened the TPLF’s organizational cohesion but also provided Abiy with a narrative to delegitimize the party in the eyes of both Tigrayans and the international community.

In addition to these tactics, Abiy has leveraged the Ethiopian Election Commission’s withholding of the TPLF’s official party registration. This maneuver allows him to manipulate internal divisions further, playing factions against each other to achieve his goals. By maintaining control over the party’s legal status, Abiy exerts additional pressure on the TPLF, complicating its efforts to rebuild and reorganize effectively. Notably, the TPLF proceeded with its party congress without national election commission recognition, a move that Abiy has attempted to use as a pretext to delegitimize the organization.

Many factional members displayed motivations that were opportunistic or externally influenced. Abiy Ahmed’s administration capitalized on these weaknesses, targeting G2 and G4 members (see table below) who were particularly vulnerable to external pressure. Furthermore, involving non-TPLF actors in critical discussions, such as the Pretoria Agreement, exacerbated vulnerabilities, as these individuals often lacked the ideological grounding to defend TPLF’s objectives.

For now, these strategies appear to yield results for Abiy as the TPLF grapples with internal divisions and ideological drift. Federal narratives portraying the TPLF as dysfunctional and out of touch with its constituents have amplified these challenges, diminished the party’s credibility, and undermined its cohesion. By destabilizing the TPLF leadership, Abiy’s administration seeks to erode its organizational structure and weaken its capacity to resist federal policies or mobilize Tigray’s autonomy. However, the long-term implications of these tactics may not only impact the TPLF but also risk deepening divisions within Ethiopia, complicating the prospects for lasting peace and stability.

1. Leveraging Geopolitical Alliances: Speculations on Strategies Against Eritrea

Abiy Ahmed’s strategy toward Tigray has consistently been one of marginalization, a tactic he has openly endorsed. On several occasions, particularly during parliamentary addresses, Abiy expressed confidence that Tigray would never again be a central force in Ethiopian politics. These remarks were part of a broader narrative aimed at portraying Tigray as a defeated and irrelevant region, effectively reducing its historical and political significance. For many observers, this was not just rhetoric but a reflection of Abiy’s overarching strategy to dismantle Tigray’s influence on Ethiopia’s political landscape.

Abiy’s attempts to bypass Tigray’s geopolitical importance initially included a diplomatic push for direct access to the sea through Somaliland. This effort culminated in public declarations of a historic agreement that would provide Ethiopia with unfettered access to the Indian Ocean. However, the deal never materialized, as it created significant geopolitical rifts, particularly with Somalia, which considers Somaliland part of its sovereign territory. The failure of this strategy, compounded by Ethiopia’s growing diplomatic isolation from its neighbors, forced Abiy to seek mediation from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to repair relations with Somalia. These developments underscored Abiy’s miscalculation and failure to marginalize Tigray by securing alternative sea access⁵.

Pivoting from Somaliland, Abiy shifted his focus to Eritrea’s Red Sea ports, particularly Asab. His narrative now includes the possibility of using the Tigrayan Defense Forces (TDF) as a strategic asset against Eritrea. By proposing a partnership with TDF, Abiy seeks to engage Tigrayans in a potential military conflict with Eritrea, leveraging their grievances against Isayas Afeworki’s regime. This strategy serves multiple objectives: weakening Eritrea, consolidating control over Asab, and further consuming Tigray’s resources and energy in protracted conflict. In doing so, Abiy hopes to prolong the animosity between Tigrayans and Eritreans, a division that has historical roots and serves his broader objective of weakening both regions.

1. Historical Roots of Tigrayan-Eritrean Animosity

The animosity between Tigrayans and Eritreans is deeply rooted in ideological and historical differences. From the outset, the TPLF and Shaebia (now PFDJ) pursued fundamentally divergent visions for governance. While TPLF championed self-determination, federalism, and democratic governance, Shaebia adhered to a centralized, authoritarian model under Isayas Afeworki’s leadership. Despite tactical cooperation during their struggle against the Derg regime, both parties understood that their ideological paths were irreconcilable.

This divide became evident during Eritrea’s secession, a process facilitated by TPLF’s recognition of the Eritrean referendum. While TPLF saw this as a fulfillment of its commitment to self-determination, many Ethiopians, particularly Amhara elites, viewed it as an act of betrayal—a unilateral “handover” of sovereign Ethiopian territory. This perception fueled resentment toward TPLF and Tigrayans, further entrenching anti-Tigrayan sentiment.

The 1998-2000 border war underscored these tensions. Shaebia’s provocative occupation of Badime triggered a devastating conflict, costing thousands of lives. For Isayas, destabilizing Tigray was a strategic imperative to prevent the emergence of a strong, stable Tigray that could challenge Eritrea’s fragile identity. This animosity persisted even as TPLF’s earlier support had been instrumental in securing Eritrea’s independence, creating a paradoxical relationship between the two.

Some observers speculate that both TPLF and PFDJ leaders may have harbored a long-term vision of a unified Tigrayan-Eritrean front, drawing on shared cultural and historical ties to counterbalance the dominant Amhara and Oromo nations in the south. However, mutual distrust and competing priorities have made this vision unattainable, exacerbating hostilities.

Abiy Ahmed has exploited this historical animosity for his political advantage, pursuing what appears to be a dual objective of weakening and destabilizing both Eritrea and Tigray. With a potentially sinister strategy, Abiy may seek to achieve a complete conquest of Eritrea by replicating the devastation inflicted on Tigray. This plan could involve nurturing Eritrean opposition groups to help establish a Prosperity Party-style administration in Eritrea, consolidating his control over the region. In this scenario, Abiy likely envisions Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) as instrumental in executing such a campaign, all while further depleting their capacity and strength. A weakened TDF would align with his broader goal of ensuring that Tigray can no longer pose a significant threat to his ambitions.

Alternatively, if full control of Eritrea proves unfeasible due to international pressures, Abiy may pursue a more focused objective: the annexation of southern Eritrea, particularly the Assab port. This strategic move would not only grant Ethiopia critical access to the Red Sea but also consume the resources and strength of both TDF and Eritrean forces in the process, leaving both sides significantly weakened. However, this calculation overlooks a critical reality: the enduring resilience of the Tigrayan people, both in the North (Eritrea) and South (Tigray). It is unlikely that they would submit to such forced domination indefinitely, even under the most coercive circumstances. Abiy’s ambitions risk perpetuating a cycle of destruction and resistance, hindering any chance of lasting stability in the region.

4.2 Implications of Abiy’s Strategies on Tigray’s Political Dynamics

In conclusion, Abiy Ahmed’s strategies toward Tigray have left an indelible mark on the region’s political and social dynamics. While his efforts to dismantle the TPLF and marginalize Tigray have achieved short-term disruptions, they have also exposed the limits of coercive governance in a region defined by resilience and profound historical unity. By fostering divisions within the TPLF and leveraging historical grievances, Abiy has sought to erode Tigray’s political cohesion. However, rather than neutralizing the TPLF, these tactics have revealed the underlying strength of Tigrayan identity and its capacity to endure external and internal pressures.

The implications of these strategies extend beyond Tigray, threatening to destabilize Ethiopia’s fragile federal structure. Abiy’s attempts to play factions against one another and manipulate regional alliances risk creating long-term fissures within Ethiopia’s political landscape. The reliance on divide-and-rule tactics undermines the very fabric of governance, replacing dialogue and inclusivity with opportunism and distrust. Furthermore, the fallout from these actions—ranging from slippery relations with Eritrea to failing diplomatic overtures in Somaliland—demonstrates the unsustainability of policies driven by short-term gains rather than strategic foresight.

Yet, the cost of these strategies is not borne by Abiy alone. Tigray’s internal political dynamics have been profoundly reshaped, with factionalism threatening the region’s ability to consolidate its leadership and focus on reconstruction. The TPLF, while facing significant internal and external challenges, remains a cornerstone of Tigrayan political identity. Its ability to navigate these turbulent waters will determine whether Tigray emerges as a cohesive force capable of safeguarding its autonomy and addressing the needs of its people.

Abiy Ahmed’s policies highlight a crucial lesson: genuine governance cannot thrive on coercion and division. Tigray’s resilience—rooted in its collective identity—remains a beacon of hope amid the crisis. For Ethiopia to break free from cycles of conflict, fostering inclusive dialogue and prioritizing reconciliation are imperative. Without these, the repercussions will continue to destabilize not only Tigray but the broader region.

5. Root Causes of Factionalism within TPLF

The external factors discussed earlier played a critical role in aggravating the internal dynamics of the TPLF, especially during the harrowing years from 2015 onward, through the genocidal war and its aftermath. These external pressures did more than test the resilience of the TPLF; they exploited and amplified the weaknesses already embedded within the party’s structure. To fully grasp the root causes of factionalism within the TPLF, it is necessary to shift focus inward, examining how internal vulnerabilities within the party’s structure and leadership compounded the pressures exerted by external forces. The interplay between these factors reveals deeper organizational and ideological fractures that have undermined the party’s cohesion and effectiveness.

Factionalism within the TPLF is symptomatic of broader issues political organizations face in post-conflict settings. As a Tigrayan deeply concerned about the ongoing political dynamics in my homeland, I have observed how these divisions have undermined the unity and effectiveness of the TPLF, a party that once played a central role in our region’s political and social fabric. This ‘potentially’ destructive factionalism is not merely an internal issue; it reflects deep-rooted challenges that must be understood and addressed.

Several key factors contribute to this phenomenon:

5.1 Recruitment Gaps

The TPLF’s organizational structure was historically designed to ensure efficiency and discipline, with clear hierarchies and vetting systems that upheld its ideological foundation. Emerging from a student movement in the 1960s, the TPLF’s ideology was born out of the revolutionary fervor of the time, shaped by global movements and the experiences of Tigrayan students at Addis Ababa University. These students, inspired by revolutions worldwide, concluded that armed struggle was the only viable path to achieving their goals, given the political repression and rigidity of the ruling regimes of the time. Upon returning to Tigray, the TPLF transformed into a Front, blending armed resistance with a robust public propaganda campaign that successfully garnered widespread support from the Tigrayan population.

The party’s ability to frame its struggle as addressing fundamental societal questions—self-governance, democracy, and development—allowed it to secure mass backing. This narrative resonated deeply with the Tigrayan people, who overwhelmingly supported the cause, contributing financially, socially, and through the enlistment of sons and daughters into the armed struggle. The symbiotic relationship between the TPLF and the Tigrayan public solidified the party’s legitimacy, making it a cornerstone of Tigrayan identity even after its military victory in 1991.

However, transitioning from an armed struggle to a governing political party posed new challenges. Combatants, who had been instrumental during the conflict, were filtered based on their roles post-victory: many joined the national defense forces, others returned to civilian life in Tigray, and a select few transitioned into the political wing to continue as party members. To maintain its organizational capacity, the TPLF initiated a systematic recruitment process to fill its ranks across all levels, from local Tabia and Woreda positions to regional and federal roles. This recruitment process relied on the “Wohayo” system, a vetting mechanism that ensured new members were ideologically aligned and committed to the party’s principles.

• The Evolution of Membership Dynamics

Two critical factors influenced the TPLF’s recruitment and membership trajectory post-1991. First, the overwhelming public support that the party enjoyed meant that nearly every Tigrayan family had a direct stake in its success. This support, deeply rooted in the collective sacrifices of the armed struggle, persisted even during times of political turbulence. However, as Tigrayans became more politically aware, particularly after the demise of the late Prime Minister and during the subsequent years of TPLF’s degeneration—years that culminated in the disintegration of the EPRDF—critical voices began to emerge, questioning whether TPLF’s ideology and strategies were responsible for the heavy toll paid by the population. While the party retained widespread support, this growing scrutiny underscored the importance of delivering on promises and adapting to evolving societal needs.

Second, while the TPLF’s initial recruitment efforts prioritized individuals with ideological commitment and competence, this focus began to shift in the mid-to-late 1990s. During this period, the party’s ranks saw an influx of spoiler candidates—individuals driven by self-interest rather than collective goals. These recruits, often admitted through a diluted Wohayo process, lacked the ideological rigor and dedication that had defined the party’s earlier members. As a result, the quality of political administration deteriorated, with party members increasingly perceived as disconnected from the Tigrayan public’s aspirations.

• Recruitment and its Impact on Party Activities

The recruitment and membership dynamics of any political organization are critical to its success, as they shape its ability to implement policies and maintain public trust. For the TPLF, the shift from recruiting ideologically aligned and competent individuals to expanding its base without rigorous vetting diluted its organizational cohesion. Members who failed to uphold the party’s principles weakened its ability to deliver on promises, eroding its credibility over time. This underscores the importance of ensuring that recruitment processes align with the party’s foundational values and adapt to the changing political landscape.

For the TPLF, the consequences of recruitment gaps are evident in the growing factionalism and declining public trust that now threaten its survival. Addressing these gaps requires not only a return to rigorous vetting mechanisms like the Wohayo system but also a commitment to nurturing ideologically aligned leadership capable of responding to Tigray’s evolving challenges.

Under the Wohayo system, candidates were first introduced at the Woreda level, where they were observed and evaluated based on their dedication, ideological alignment, and community service. This vetting process involved multiple stages, during which candidates underwent scrutiny by existing members and leadership. Only those who met the expectations of their superiors progressed to higher levels of the system. Full endorsement by the Wohayo was required for candidates to achieve full membership status, signifying their acceptance into the party’s ranks. This structured approach was designed to ensure a steady influx of individuals who shared the party’s vision and principles, contributing to its cohesion and effectiveness.

However, my personal experience with the Wohayo system revealed deep-seated flaws that undermined its objectives. Invited to participate as a potential member, I approached the system with the intent to test its receptiveness to new ideas and critical debate. What I observed, however, was a process that often failed to attract individuals with the qualities essential for political membership: a firm grasp of the party’s ideology, policies, and programs; the discipline and commitment required to implement those programs effectively; and the self-awareness, character, and humility necessary to earn the respect of both party supporters and the public at large.

Instead, the system appeared skewed toward favoring loyalty to superiors over merit. Candidates who challenged the status quo or introduced ideas that deviated from established norms were often regarded as threats rather than contributors. This resistance to internal debate—denied by many active cadres but evident in practice—resulted in the approval of individuals who lacked the ideological and personal qualities critical to effective party membership.

Over time, these recruitment flaws diluted the quality of the TPLF’s membership, allowing individuals without the necessary competencies to ascend within the party. This influx of unqualified members disrupted the organic structure of the organization, compromising its ability to fulfill its ideological mission and maintain public trust. Unless the TPLF reevaluates its recruitment doctrine and practice, these systemic issues will continue to hinder the party’s capacity to evolve and respond to the challenges facing Tigray.

• Leadership Erosion

1. Meles Zenawi’s Strategic Vision and the Sacrifice of Tigray

Meles Zenawi envisioned Ethiopia as a federation where economic development and the recognition of nations’ rights would form the bedrock of a stable and equitable state. This ambitious vision necessitated a delicate balancing act—building a functional federal system while addressing Ethiopia’s deep-seated ethnic, economic, and political divisions. To achieve this, Meles placed significant emphasis on fostering a collective national identity and promoting economic progress across the federation, even at the expense of prioritizing Tigray’s specific needs. Many Tigrayans now view this approach as a calculated sacrifice, where Meles subordinated the interests of Tigray to the broader goals of creating a unified and prosperous Ethiopia.

While Meles recognized the immense challenges of this undertaking, he believed it was achievable. His strategic focus on economic development, combined with a commitment to securing the rights of nations and nationalities, underpinned his leadership. However, this approach came at a cost: a growing perception among Tigrayans that their region’s interests were being overlooked in the broader scheme of national development. This tension was further exacerbated by Meles’s policies toward Eritrea, which many in Tigray found deeply puzzling.

1. The Eritrea Question and the Overlooked Threat of Isayas Afeworki

One of the most contentious aspects of Meles’s legacy is his policy toward Eritrea and the despotic regime of Isayas Afeworki. Despite the existential threat posed by the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) to Tigrayans on both sides of the Mereb River, Meles chose not to take decisive action when opportunities arose. This hesitation became most evident during the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war of 1998–2000, a conflict that could have provided the Ethiopian leadership with an opportune moment to decisively address the destabilizing role of the Eritrean regime.

For many, Meles’s reluctance to confront Isayas Afeworki during this period is a critical failure of his leadership. A more assertive policy toward Eritrea at that time could have fundamentally altered the political dynamics of the region, potentially neutralizing a long-term threat to Tigray’s security and stability. Instead, Meles’s focus remained on his vision for a federal Ethiopia, perhaps underestimating the enduring hostility of the PFDJ and its capacity to disrupt the region’s progress.

• The Void Left Behind

Meles’s failure to act decisively against the Eritrean regime is particularly perplexing given his acute awareness of the dangers posed by spoilers to Ethiopia’s fragile political process. He once described his nightmare as the possibility of the entire political framework unraveling due to the actions of a single disruptive actor. Yet, when faced with the PFDJ—a regime that epitomized this threat—Meles opted for policies that many Tigrayans view as overly cautious or misaligned with Tigray’s long-term interests.

This paradox underscores the duality of Meles’s legacy: a leader of extraordinary intellect and vision whose strategic decisions sometimes left his own base vulnerable. By prioritizing the federal experiment and seeking to accommodate diverse interests, Meles may have underestimated the unique threats facing Tigray, believing that time, economic progress, and institutional development would mitigate these risks. However, his death exposed a deeper vulnerability: the erosion of leadership and institutional capacity within the TPLF and EPRDF.

The remaining leadership within both the TPLF and EPRDF were unable to match Meles’s skills, either in sustaining the momentum of party efficiency or in building the robust institutions necessary to uphold the principles of economic progress and governance transformation. This failure accelerated the fragmentation of the political apparatus and weakened its ability to withstand external pressures. The fragility of the system Meles sought to build, coupled with his successors’ inability to address these shortcomings, has left Tigray to face the devastating consequences of unresolved threats and weakened leadership.

• Lack of Mechanisms for Internal Debate and Leadership Deficiency

The TPLF historically prided itself on its structured processes for resolving ideological and policy differences. When disagreements arose among the politburo members on core issues, they would often prepare detailed position papers, engage in rounds of discussions, and escalate debates to the central committee, Woreda, or Tabia-level Wohayo structures as necessary. On critical matters, the party congress could be convened to pass major resolutions. This culture of “critical evaluations” (ገምጋም), characterized by lengthy meeting sessions, became a hallmark of the TPLF, ensuring cadres at all levels were given ample opportunity to deliberate and contribute to decision-making.

However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms depended heavily on the intellectual and leadership capacities of the individuals involved. Under Meles Zenawi’s leadership, these discussions were often enriched by his ability to articulate complex ideas, synthesize diverse viewpoints, and align party members toward common goals. Yet, even during his tenure, only a handful of leaders, notably Meles, Abay Tsehaye and a few others, demonstrated the capacity to contribute meaningfully to these deliberations. The majority of cadres were passive participants—”listeners” who lacked the depth to challenge ideas constructively or offer innovative solutions. Worse still, many cadres, especially those in groups like G4 and G5, excelled in merely parroting what had already been said, rather than truly internalizing issues, preparing themselves through reading and writing, or enriching the ideas being debated.

This issue extended beyond the TPLF and deeply afflicted the broader EPRDF coalition. Leaders like Hailemariam Desalegn, Demeke Mekonnen, Redwan Hussien, Girma Birru, Gedu Andargachew, Workneh Gebeyehu, and many others exemplified this tendency. Their contributions often reflected an inability to critically engage with complex policy matters or to propose original solutions. This mimicry created a stagnant intellectual environment within the party, stifling innovation and adaptability. There were, however, exceptions—personalities like Bereket Simon, who, despite their potential to address these shortcomings, were sidelined from leadership positions.

1. Leadership Deficiencies After Meles Zenawi

Following Meles’s death, the leadership gap within the TPLF became increasingly apparent. Abay Woldu, who succeeded Meles, lacked both the intellectual capacity and the skills necessary to lead and implement party programs effectively. His tenure was marked by a significant decline in the party’s cohesion and performance. His successor, Debretsion Gebremichael, displayed a better sense of readiness and commitment but similarly lacked the acumen required for effective leadership. His inability to build consensus among the politburo and central committee members further exacerbated internal divisions.

When a leader is not adequately qualified—especially in an environment where the majority of team members are also underqualified—the performance of the team not only declines but creates cascading problems that destabilize the entire organization. For the TPLF, this dynamic led to prolonged inefficiency, weakened implementation of programs, and growing factionalism within the party.

1. The Backfire of Lengthy Deliberations

Without strong leadership, the TPLF’s culture of lengthy meetings and critical evaluations began to backfire. What once served as a mechanism for cohesion and ideological alignment became a breeding ground for factionalism. Elite members who lost respect for one another formed internal groupings that undermined the unity of the politburo and the broader party structure. Between 2014 and 2018, these divisions reached a critical point, rendering the party apparatus increasingly dysfunctional.

This period also coincided with Ethiopia’s economic boom, which saw the rise of successful businesses and a growing class of millionaires. The internal factionalism within the TPLF made the party vulnerable to misuse, as some members leveraged their wealth to promote personal agendas, further derailing party discipline. The absence of accountability allowed these dynamics to fester, compounding the party’s decline.

• Cumulative Effects and Degeneration

The TPLF’s inability to address these internal challenges—combined with the external pressures and animosities discussed earlier—accelerated its degeneration. By the time the party faced existential threats in the late 2010s, it had already lost much of its internal cohesion and public trust. The weaknesses in leadership, the lack of skilled cadres, and the misuse of the party’s mechanisms for internal debate all contributed to a rapid decline that left the TPLF ill-equipped to navigate Tigray’s growing political crises and Ethiopia’s in general.

• The Centrality of Party Discipline and the Consequences of Ideological Drift

In political economies like Ethiopia and similar developing contexts, party discipline is not merely a procedural necessity—it is a cornerstone of effective governance and policy implementation. For revolutionary democracy to succeed, party members must adhere strictly to core ideologies and prioritize collective goals over personal interests. Deviation from these principles risks undermining the party’s ability to promote its policies and programs effectively, while simultaneously increasing vulnerability to external forces and internal fragmentation.

This was a key tenet of Meles Zenawi’s governance philosophy. Meles believed that revolutionary democracy required a disciplined party apparatus to shield the system from the destabilizing effects of ideological drift and personal ambition. Without such discipline, the transformative goals of the party would falter, and the state would be exposed to spoilers and external pressures.

The rise of Abiy Ahmed to power exemplifies the dangers of ideological deviation and undisciplined party structures. Within the EPRDF, factionalism and the erosion of party discipline created an environment where members became susceptible to external influences and pursued individual agendas at the expense of collective priorities. Abiy’s ascent marked a significant departure from the revolutionary democratic framework, focusing instead on consolidating personal power and undermining the party’s foundational principles. This shift disrupted not only the policy continuity of the EPRDF but also its capacity to withstand external pressures, further destabilizing the country.

The TPLF, despite its historical emphasis on discipline, was not immune to these challenges. After Meles, the party struggled to maintain the cohesion and ideological alignment necessary for revolutionary democracy to function. The lack of strong leadership, combined with factional conflicts and personal ambition, weakened its internal mechanisms and eroded its ability to respond effectively to the challenges facing Tigray and Ethiopia at large.

Today, this lack of discipline and ideological clarity is starkly evident in the factionalism plaguing the TPLF. Some members and cadres have aligned themselves with ideologies and rhetoric introduced by Abiy Ahmed, adopting positions that diverge significantly from the party’s core principles. These factions, often seduced by the allure of Abiy’s “unity” narratives and promises of reform, have further deepened internal divisions within the TPLF. This ideological drift not only undermines the party’s historical mission but also exposes it to manipulation by external forces, jeopardizing its capacity to represent and defend Tigray’s interests. The rhetoric of “modernization” and “unity” espoused by Abiy serves as a convenient guise for advancing personal or opportunistic agendas, highlighting the urgency for the TPLF to reclaim its ideological foundation and reestablish discipline among its ranks.

6. A Shift in the Nature of Factionalism: The Threat to Tigray’s Survival

Disagreements or ideological inflections are not new in the TPLF’s core leadership. Historically, the party navigated such differences through disciplined internal rules, maintaining its structure and unity. While often robust, these internal debates were constructive, allowing the TPLF to evolve strategically and cohesively. The current factionalism, however, is fundamentally different. Its destructive nature threatens not only the TPLF but the very survival of Tigray as a region.

The breakdown in the party’s traditional governance and accountability mechanisms has turned internal disputes into existential threats. The disciplined frameworks once used to resolve conflicts have eroded, leaving a vacuum that external forces and opportunistic internal actors have exploited. This failure to manage disagreements constructively has undermined the TPLF’s legitimacy and destabilized the broader political system in Tigray.

Adding to the crisis is the role of social media, which has become a potent tool for those splintering from the TPLF to promote their ideologies and discredit the party. These individuals, many of whom once upheld the core principles of the organization, now openly negate and deny its foundational ideals. Their rhetoric, tailored to specific groups and locations within Tigray, resonates particularly with the younger generation, who are often drawn to contemporary ideologies that are easy to sell in the digital age. This shift, driven by the allure of social media, risks eroding decades of collective identity and shared purpose.

Tigray now faces an unparalleled crisis. Its people are suffering under severe economic siege, its territory remains occupied by external forces, and millions of displaced citizens endure desperate living conditions. The evolving factionalism within the TPLF, rather than addressing these urgent challenges, exacerbates the situation. Divisions within the party weaken its ability to represent and defend the interests of Tigray, leaving the region vulnerable to further marginalization and exploitation.

What makes this factionalism particularly alarming is its refusal to evolve into a constructive form. In many contexts, factionalism can lead to political innovation or the emergence of alternate parties that challenge the status quo. Within the TPLF, however, these divisions have created an impasse. Factions cling to the same name and constitution while undermining one another, further eroding the party’s credibility. This dynamic not only destabilizes the TPLF but also deepens the broader crisis facing Tigray, compounding the suffering of its people.

If these divisions are not addressed with care and urgency, the consequences could be catastrophic. The erosion of core principles, amplified by social media’s influence, poses a direct threat to the cohesion of Tigrayan society. Left unchecked, this crisis risks pushing Tigray further into instability, potentially jeopardizing the survival of the Tigrayan identity itself. Understanding the root causes of this factionalism and its impact on Tigray’s current predicament is essential for charting a path forward. Tigray’s survival depends on structural reforms and unity within its political leadership. Without introspection and collective action, the TPLF risks becoming an obstacle to the very aspirations it once championed. The stakes have never been higher: overcoming its internal divisions is not just a matter of party survival but a necessity for the survival of Tigray itself.

The evolving factionalism within the TPLF, rather than addressing these urgent challenges, exacerbates the situation. Divisions within the party weaken its ability to represent and defend the interests of Tigray, leaving the region vulnerable to further marginalization and exploitation.

What makes this crisis particularly volatile is the attempt by splinter factions to position themselves as the legitimate heirs of the TPLF, despite lacking the support of the party’s congress and broader membership. With around 15 members claiming this mantle, these factions risk deepening divisions and undermining the legitimacy of the TPLF, which continues to have the support of the majority of its members and the Tigrayan people. This issue is further compounded by external forces, particularly Abiy Ahmed and the Ethiopian election commission, which have not yet reinstated the TPLF on the list of legitimate political parties. This omission appears to be a calculated move to fuel ongoing divisions in Tigray, using the crisis to weaken the region’s political unity and disrupt its transitional processes.

Understanding and addressing this covert objective is critical for Tigray and its people. Aligning with the legitimate TPLF, as recognized by its congress and the majority of its members, is essential to maintain a stable political transition and effectively manage the current crisis. Failure to do so risks enabling external manipulation and further jeopardizing the region’s stability.

Resolving this factionalism requires careful, peaceful engagement, ensuring that all voices can contribute constructively to Tigray’s political future. However, allowing splinter groups to exploit the TPLF’s legacy without accountability threatens to further destabilize the region. This moment demands a renewed focus on unity, legitimacy, and resistance to external interference, aligning Tigray’s political leadership with the collective will of its people.

The factionalism plaguing the TPLF cannot be fully understood without examining the party’s internal dynamics and the composition of its membership. Over the years, the TPLF’s ability to act cohesively has been deeply influenced by the varying levels of ideological commitment, skill, and motivation among its members. The lack of strong leadership, combined with the rise of factions and opportunistic behaviors, has amplified these differences, turning them into barriers to effective governance. By analyzing the composition of the TPLF’s membership, we can gain valuable insights into the root causes of its current challenges and draw lessons from broader organizational theories on team effectiveness and leadership.

7. Classification of TPLF Members

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has long been shaped by the diverse capabilities, motivations, and ideological alignments of its members. These differences have significantly influenced the party’s internal dynamics, affecting its ability to respond to both internal challenges and external pressures. Drawing on established organizational frameworks and observations, TPLF members can be grouped into five distinct categories that reflect their varying contributions to the party’s effectiveness. These classifications not only shed light on the root causes of the TPLF’s current challenges but also offer insights into potential pathways for reform.

1. Committed Executors (G1):

Description: Members who lack a deep understanding of the party’s ideology or strategic objectives but demonstrate high dedication and humility. Their primary strength lies in grassroots mobilization, where their sincerity and commitment earn public trust.

Strengths: Reliable in operational and routine tasks that require persistence rather than strategic thinking.

Weaknesses: Depend heavily on direction from others and contribute little to high-level decision-making or innovation.

Organizational Parallel: Support Specialists – individuals who ensure continuity at the operational level but need strong leadership to guide their efforts.

1. Disruptive Opportunists (G2):

Description: Members with limited ideological alignment or skill, often driven by self-interest. Their actions frequently prioritize personal gain over collective goals, alienating constituents and undermining the party’s credibility.

Strengths: Occasionally effective in creating visibility, though this is often overshadowed by their negative traits.

Weaknesses: Tend to disrupt cohesion, foster internal resentment, and erode public trust. Their inefficiency and arrogance amplify organizational challenges.

Organizational Parallel: Dysfunctional Contributors – individuals whose lack of alignment with team goals creates inefficiencies and undermines the group’s overall effectiveness.

1. Reliable Performers (G3):

Description: Members who combine moderate skill with a genuine commitment to the party’s ideology. They are reliable contributors, acting as the backbone of the organization by consistently delivering on tasks.

Strengths: Provide stability and ensure that routine functions of the organization are maintained.

Weaknesses: While dependable, they may lack the capacity for strategic leadership or high-level innovation.

Organizational Parallel: Core Team Players – individuals who uphold the group’s functionality through steady and consistent contributions.

1. Latent Achievers (G4):

Description: Highly skilled and ideologically aligned individuals who lack the motivation or engagement to act decisively. Despite their potential, they often remain underutilized, representing a significant missed opportunity for impactful contributions.

Strengths: Capable of delivering high-quality outcomes when engaged effectively.

Weaknesses: Without strong leadership or clear incentives, they tend to remain disengaged, contributing minimally to organizational goals.

Organizational Parallel: Underutilized Talent – individuals with untapped potential whose effectiveness depends on alignment and motivation.

1. Strategic Visionaries (G5):

Description: The ideal members who fully embody the party’s values and objectives. They possess the skill, motivation, and strategic thinking needed to drive the party forward.

Strengths: Lead by example, articulate clear goals, and inspire others to align with collective priorities. Their ability to synthesize and implement ideas makes them indispensable.

Weaknesses: Their scarcity is a major concern; with the proportion of G5 members dwindling to 1%, the party’s foundation is increasingly fragile.

Organizational Parallel: High-Impact Leaders – visionaries who align strategy with execution and foster excellence.

 

• The Impact of Membership Composition on TPLF’s Effectiveness

  

Group	Pre-Meles	Post-Meles	2009/10 Politburo/Central Committee (%)	Characteristics
Committed Executors (G1)	5%	10%	5%	Dedicated but lacking deep understanding; excel in grassroots mobilization with guided leadership.
Disruptive Opportunists (G2)	10%	20%	40%	Misaligned and self-centered members who undermine cohesion and public trust.
Reliable Performers (G3)	68%	54%	35%	Dependable contributors who provide stability but lack strategic foresight.
Latent Achievers (G4)	15%	15%	15%	Highly skilled but disengaged members whose potential remains underutilized.
Strategic Visionaries (G5)	2%	1%	5%	Ideal members who align vision, strategy, and execution, driving organizational excellence.

The current composition of TPLF members reveals a troubling trend. Under Meles Zenawi’s leadership, the party’s membership leaned heavily toward G3 and G4 categories, which provided stability, strategic vision, and operational reliability. In contrast, the years following his tenure saw a rise in G1 and G2 members, whose limitations in skill and ideological alignment diluted the party’s effectiveness.

The dominance of ‘G2’ type members (Disruptive Opportunists) within the politburo and central committee starting around 2009/10 marked a critical shift in the TPLF’s trajectory. These individuals were not necessarily driven by personal agendas but exhibited traits that made them poorly suited for genuine political leadership. Many had benefited from their academic achievements or affiliations with key TPLF/EPRDF circles, which granted them access to privileges and comfort within the party system. However, this detachment from the realities of lower-level society undermined their ability to connect with grassroots movements or prioritize the collective well-being.

Instead of fostering discipline and service-oriented leadership, these members became preoccupied with personal comforts and appearances. They were often seen prioritizing their own well-being—focusing on the type of government car they drove, surrounding themselves with businesspeople who catered to their needs, and indulging in frequent travel rather than attending to the demands of their office. Their obsession with privileges and their unwillingness to dedicate time and patience to meaningful public service revealed a lack of authenticity in their political engagement. Such behaviors starkly contrasted with the qualities of disciplined and genuine politicians required to sustain TPLF’s mission.

These tendencies eroded the credibility of the politburo and central committee, creating a leadership culture detached from the grassroots values that had once defined the TPLF. The rise of such members contributed significantly to the party’s inability to address internal challenges or respond effectively to external threats. Coupled with the simultaneous decline of ‘G5’ type members (Strategic Visionaries), this shift left the party increasingly fragmented and vulnerable to factionalism.

Figure 1. Team Effectiveness and the TPLF Crisis

This shift has significant implications for organizational performance. Contemporary organizational theories emphasize that team effectiveness depends on balancing skills and motivation. Teams dominated by disengaged or misaligned individuals (G2 and G4) often experience dysfunction, inefficiency, and vulnerability to external pressures. Conversely, teams with a high proportion of motivated and skilled members (G3 and G5) achieve greater cohesion and resilience.

7.2 Leadership and Reform

Strong leadership is critical to aligning team composition with organizational goals. Meles Zenawi’s leadership exemplified this, as he successfully mobilized even disengaged members by articulating clear goals and enforcing accountability. However, the decline in leadership quality post-Meles exposed the weaknesses within the TPLF’s membership structure. Without capable leaders to inspire and guide, the party’s latent achievers (G4) and disruptive opportunists (G2) have increasingly derailed its mission.

The emergence of splinter factions further complicates the picture. These factions, composed of diverse member types, risk amplifying the TPLF’s internal divisions unless reforms are implemented. Addressing these challenges requires:

1. Strengthening Recruitment: Ensuring ideological alignment and competence in new members.
2. Reinvigorating Leadership: Cultivating leaders who can inspire, align, and mobilize cadres effectively.
3. Fostering Cohesion: Building systems that promote collective responsibility and mitigate factionalism.

By addressing its internal dynamics, the TPLF can rebuild its foundation and reclaim its role as a unifying force for Tigray during this critical period.

These observations are not intended as definitive conclusions but as a framework for reflection and dialogue. The TPLF and its stakeholders must critically examine these trends and address the internal challenges that jeopardize the party’s unity and effectiveness. By fostering open discussion, rebuilding grassroots connections, and re-evaluating recruitment and governance practices, the TPLF can reclaim its role as a unifying force for Tigray. At this critical juncture, such reforms are essential not only for the party’s survival but also for the stability and future of Tigray as a whole.

8. Final Reflections and Pathways Forward

The ongoing political crisis within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) represents both a pivotal challenge and a moment of reckoning for the party. As Tigray navigates its post-conflict reality, the divisions within its most prominent political organization threaten not only the party’s future but also the stability and aspirations of the Tigrayan people. This final section provides an assessment of the crisis and outlines potential pathways forward, emphasizing the need for unity, vision, and pragmatic solutions.

8.1 Assessing the Crisis

The internal divisions within the TPLF are deeply entrenched, rooted in historical recruitment gaps, leadership erosion, and a failure to adapt to evolving political realities. The emergence of splinter factions claiming the TPLF’s legacy exacerbates this crisis, creating an existential threat to the party and the region. These factions often exploit modern platforms like social media to propagate their ideologies, targeting specific groups and regions within Tigray. By doing so, they not only deepen divisions but also risk undermining the very identity and solidarity of the Tigrayan people.

Compounding these challenges is the external manipulation of Tigray’s political landscape by actors like Abiy Ahmed’s administration. The refusal to reinstate the TPLF as a legitimate political entity further destabilizes the region and fuels factionalism. This covert strategy aims to weaken Tigray’s political coherence, leaving its people vulnerable to continued economic and geopolitical pressures.

8.2 Strategic Imperatives for Tigray’s Political Future

As Tigray navigates its post-conflict reality, the region stands at a crossroads where decisive action is needed to secure its long-term stability and sovereignty. The TPLF, as Tigray’s primary political force, must address pressing challenges while laying the groundwork for a unified and resilient future. This requires prioritizing immediate actions to reconnect with the grassroots and mobilize popular support, while also tackling broader geopolitical and institutional issues. The following imperatives outline a strategic path forward that balances the urgency of the present with the vision needed to guide Tigray through this critical juncture.

1. Re-establishing Grassroots Connections and Mobilizing Political Support:

At this critical juncture, TPLF’s foremost task is to reconnect with the grassroots, rebuilding trust and solidarity with the people of Tigray. This connection must form the foundation of a peaceful but decisive political movement that resists covert maneuvers by external actors, including Abiy Ahmed and factions aligned with him.

The upcoming 50th anniversary of the TPLF provides a historic opportunity to cement this political movement, reaffirming the unity and resilience of the Tigrayan people. Through this milestone, the TPLF must send a clear message: Tigray remains united, ready to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

2. Engaging Eritrean Opposition for a Unified Vision:

TPLF must actively engage with relevant Eritrean opposition groups, both within Eritrea and in the diaspora, to forge a unified vision for all Tigrayans. This collaboration should initiate a new political discourse that embraces and articulates Tigrayans’ long-term strategic vision (ባሕጊ), ensuring it becomes a guiding principle for the region’s future.

3. Institutional Renewal and Leadership Development:

While addressing immediate priorities, TPLF must also commit to critically revisiting its institutional challenges, particularly its membership doctrine. Leveraging modern tools and strategies, the party should work to revitalize its rank and file while identifying and elevating skilled, principled, and gifted politicians to leadership roles.

4. Challenging Abiy Ahmed and Enhancing Diplomatic Engagement:

TPLF must confront Abiy Ahmed’s political maneuvers directly, holding him accountable for fulfilling his obligations under the Pretoria agreement. At the same time, it is essential to amplify diplomatic efforts, engaging international actors to ensure the agreement’s full implementation and pursuing international justice for those responsible for the genocidal war in Tigray.

8.3 A Call for Dialogue and Unity

To address the current crisis, the TPLF must adopt a dual approach that prioritizes both internal reform and broader collaboration. This strategy is essential for fostering unity within Tigray while ensuring that the party remains true to its foundational principles and strategic goals.

1. Internal Reform:

• • Reevaluate Membership and Recruitment: The party must implement rigorous vetting processes to ensure that all future members align with TPLF’s ideological and strategic priorities. This is crucial for preserving party cohesion and credibility.
  • Foster Leadership Development: Cultivating a new generation of disciplined, visionary leaders is critical to navigating the complex political realities Tigray faces and restoring trust in the party’s leadership.
  • Reinforce Party Discipline: Principles of humility, accountability, and service must guide the party at all levels, ensuring that it functions as a unified and effective organization.

1. Broader Collaboration:

• • Engage with Splinter Groups Constructively: The TPLF must take a firm yet constructive stance with factional groups that have aligned themselves with the sinister agendas of Abiy Ahmed and forsaken Tigray’s strategic interests. While their claim to the TPLF’s legacy is politically untenable, they should be encouraged to form their own political platforms and participate in Tigray’s political discourse under a new identity. This allows for peaceful dialogue while maintaining the integrity of TPLF’s mission.
  • Seek Inclusive Governance: The interim administration in Tigray must prioritize inclusivity, ensuring diverse perspectives—within the bounds of Tigray’s strategic vision—are considered in the rebuilding process. However, the administration’s current structure has been hampered by conflicting agendas, particularly due to leadership roles held by members of the splinter group. This conflict has rendered the administration ineffective in addressing the region’s pressing challenges.

    To restore governance effectiveness, the TPLF must reassign new representatives while maintaining inclusivity by allowing splinter group members to participate. However, TPLF should strategically add additional members to the administration to ensure its majority stake and decision-making authority. This restructuring will safeguard the administration’s alignment with Tigray’s broader strategic goals.

    The restructured administration should immediately focus on implementing the key tenets of the Pretoria agreement, including the restoration of Tigray’s constitutional borders. Furthermore, it must lay the groundwork for a smooth political transition, culminating in democratic elections once the status quo ante is re-established. These steps are essential for restoring political coherence, public trust, and regional stability.

  • Champion Intellectual Discourse: Encourage open and critical academic discussions to explore innovative solutions to Tigray’s challenges. Such discourse can lay the groundwork for informed and unified political decision-making.

8.4 Managing Political Confusion

The ongoing crisis has left many Tigrayans confused and, at times, delusional about the motives and agendas of factional groups. Some hold the belief that these groups can reintegrate into the TPLF through self-assessment and self-correction. However, this is politically untenable given the gravity of their decisions to align with external ideologies that undermine Tigray’s sovereignty and strategic objectives. The TPLF congress has rightfully revoked their membership, drawing a clear line between unity and betrayal.

The path forward for these groups lies in forming independent political platforms that reflect their ideologies and waiting for the appropriate time to contribute constructively to Tigray’s political discourse. This approach fosters peaceful dialogue while safeguarding the principles and unity essential for Tigray’s future.

8.5 Looking Ahead

Tigray stands at a crossroads, where the choices made today will echo across generations. The ongoing crisis within the TPLF is not merely an organizational challenge but a reflection of deeper structural and ideological issues that demand urgent and thoughtful action. This moment calls for introspection and decisive reform, guided by a unifying vision that transcends immediate challenges and lays the foundation for long-term stability and progress.

The path forward for Tigray requires a delicate balance of resilience and adaptability. It demands leadership that reconnects with the grassroots, a collective commitment to justice and sovereignty, and the courage to articulate a strategic vision for the region’s future. By fostering open dialogue, embracing meaningful reform, and anchoring its efforts in the aspirations of its people, Tigray can reclaim its strength and unity.

As the TPLF marks its 50th anniversary, this article is dedicated to the countless heroes and heroines who have sacrificed their lives for Tigray’s progress and survival. Their unwavering commitment and courage remind us that the journey to justice, development, and sovereignty is both a shared responsibility and a profound honor. The golden jubilee is not only a time for reflection but also a call to recommit to the principles and ideals that have defined Tigray’s struggle and resilience.

This article does not pretend to offer definitive solutions. Instead, it seeks to ignite critical discourse and inspire collective action. The geopolitical complexities of the Horn of Africa and the internal dynamics within Tigray are immense, yet they also present an opportunity for renewed purpose and determination. Tigray’s history has always been one of resilience, defiance, and hope—a legacy that must now guide its path forward.

As Tigrayans reflect on their shared past and chart their future, it is my hope that this contribution will serve as a bridge: a bridge to deeper understanding, to courageous decision-making, and to a united Tigray. Let it be a call to action—for leaders, intellectuals, and the people alike—to rise to the occasion and shape a future that honors the sacrifices of the past while embracing the possibilities of tomorrow. Together, Tigray can emerge not only as a survivor of its trials but as a beacon of strength, unity, and hope for generations to come.

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