The Illusion of ሽምግልና: Balancing Mediation with Political Realities

The ongoing ሽምግልና efforts in Mekelle, initiated by concerned Tigrayans seeking to unlock the prevailing political deadlock, represent a significant attempt at fostering dialogue and stability in Tigray. If this effort aims to resolve the governance crisis in Tigray through pragmatic restructuring—ensuring a balanced political framework that acknowledges existing realities while upholding Tigray’s core interests—then it deserves recognition. However, while I appreciate the genuine intentions of the mediators, any effort toward reconciliation must be approached with extreme care and diligence. It is crucial to ensure that this process does not inadvertently serve the hidden agendas of third parties seeking to weaken Tigray’s political agency.

In my previous article, Tigray’s Path to Peace: Navigating the Political Deadlock, I proposed a realistic approach to resolving the TIRA crisis. The core of the proposal was simple: individuals from the breakaway faction, who have politically and functionally severed ties with TPLF, should retain their roles in the TIRA not as representatives of the TPLF but as representatives of the political forces they now align with—whether that be the Prosperity Party or an independent political stance. This way, governance continues, but the integrity of TPLF as the dominant Tigrayan political entity remains intact.

Yet, given the unfolding circumstances, there is a growing concern that this effort could unintentionally blur the lines between accountability and reconciliation, risking a compromise that undermines Tigray’s political integrity. Through Abiy Ahmed’s carefully orchestrated tactics, the Oromo PP has set the stage for a political theater in which TPLF is framed as the aggressor or war-monger. At the same time, the splinter group serves as an internal Trojan horse. Abiy’s recent message, thinly veiled as a warning against war, was a calculated maneuver—echoed almost verbatim by the breakaway faction—to position TPLF as an obstacle to peace. His orchestrated demonstration in Addis Ababa, presented as a gathering of the Tigrayan community endorsing his so-called peace call, further exposes the strategy at play. However, by all indications, most of those in attendance were not even Tigrayans.

For this mediation to be meaningful and constructive, it must be guided by a clear distinction between those committed to Tigray’s self-determination and those whose actions have aligned with external forces that have undermined Tigray’s survival. Any reconciliation effort should prioritize accountability, genuine political realignment, and the long-term interests of Tigray over superficial unity.

Can Irreconcilable Ideologies Be Merged into One?

No. This forced reconciliation is not about governance but diluting TPLF’s political legitimacy while ensuring that Abiy Ahmed retains control over Mekelle through his local proxies. It continues the same tactics used to destabilize TPLF after the Pretoria Agreement—covert alliances, manufactured crises, and the infiltration of Tigrayan leadership structures with actors loyal to Addis Ababa.

A true mediation would recognize that unity cannot be built on betrayal. Any political resolution must be grounded in a clear separation of roles—those who have abandoned TPLF’s ideological foundation should not be forced back into its ranks. Instead, they can be acknowledged as independent political actors and assigned roles accordingly. If mediation has any legitimacy, it should focus on a functional political framework, not an artificial ideological merger.

Recognizing the Political Context

Though this mediation is entirely initiated and led by Tigrayans, it operates within a broader political landscape influenced by PP’s grand strategy. Recent indications by PP surrogates like Abraham Belay confirm that the federal government has outlined a mechanism with TIRA for executing the resettlement of displaced Tigrayans while placing the blame on TPLF for hindering it. PP’s latest congress also included Ashetew Demile, the administrator of occupied Western Tigray, in its central committee, further cementing its intent to solidify the occupation as a permanent reality.

A Reality Check for Mediation

For mediation to serve Tigray’s interests, it must confront these realities:

• The return of displaced Tigrayans must be tied to restoring Tigray’s legal borders.
• Any process legitimizing forced demographic changes in Western Tigray should be rejected.
• Tigray’s right to self-rule cannot be compromised under the guise of peace.

The Misplaced Excitement Around እርቂ

While many on social media are excited about the possibility of reconciliation, it is crucial to distinguish between emotional enthusiasm and political reality. Mediation should not be reduced to merely reuniting individuals or factions; it must address the fundamental political and territorial issues that define Tigray’s future.

• Reconciliation should not be about bringing individuals back together but about resolving the deeper political contradictions that led to the division in the first place.
• The idea that political disputes can be resolved purely through እርቂ overlooks the fact that ideological divergence, not personal grievances, is at the heart of the crisis.
• If the mediation effort ignores the broader structural problems and merely fosters symbolic unity, it risks delaying an inevitable and necessary reckoning over Tigray’s sovereignty and governance.

The Looming Threat: Abiy’s Next Moves

Abiy shall not sleep, as TPLF remains his most significant obstacle to consolidating power. With TPLF ignoring the ultimatum issued by the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), Abiy is likely to escalate his efforts through legal maneuvers, increased federal intervention, or fueling internal divisions within Tigray. A manufactured political or legal confrontation is almost inevitable, as he seeks to weaken the party by portraying it as defiant and lawless. His propaganda machine will frame TPLF as the main hurdle to peace while positioning himself as a stabilizing force. The ongoing mediation efforts may also be weaponized in this narrative—if they fail, Abiy will use them as evidence of TPLF’s alleged incompetence in governance.

If Abiy perceives the mediation as undermining TPLF’s influence, he may subtly encourage it; however, if it strengthens TPLF’s position, federal interference is likely. The real test lies in whether this mediation remains a Tigrayan-led effort centered on political agency and sovereignty or becomes another front for external manipulation. If it fails to address the fundamental structural and ideological contradictions at play, then it is not a step toward peace—it is a political ambush, and Tigray must recognize it as such.